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In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political 
violence expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an 
unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War.  As a principal 
adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying 
asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically driven 
objectives. A scenario whereby non-state actors would acquire a nuclear 
capability not only threatens the security of the United States, but would 
destabilize the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the 
international system.  Despite US expenditures of over $86 million to help nearly 
30 countries world-wide in preventing the smuggling of weapons-useable 
radiological materials, over 20 known cases of such activity were reported 
between 1992 and 2001. Previous research has concentrated on a singularly 
defined threat: The Rogue State.  Today’s challenges are characterized by more 
defused, decentralized networks, to include transnational actors with the potential 
to proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade 
radiological material. This thesis examines the applicability of traditional Cold 
War strategies such as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive 
diplomacy in the present context, to deny extremist groups and associated 
networks the means to buy, steal, or make nuclear and radiological weapons.  
This thesis proposes a multi-dimensional approach in support of mixed-strategies 
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In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political 
violence expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an 
unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War.  As a principal 
adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying 
asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically driven 
objectives. A scenario whereby non-state actors would acquire a nuclear 
capability not only threatens the security of the United States, but would 
destabilize the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the 
international system. Despite US expenditures of over $86 million to help nearly 
30 countries world-wide in preventing the smuggling of weapons-useable 
radiological materials, over 20 known cases of such activity were reported 
between 1992 and 2001.  
Previous research has concentrated on a singularly defined threat: The 
Rogue State. Today’s challenges are characterized by more defused, 
decentralized networks, to include transnational actors with the potential to 
proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade 
radiological material.  Chapter I establishes a theoretical framework to explain 
rational choice theory and social mobilization theory as they apply to extremist 
motivations for mass destruction discussed in later chapters.  Chapter II 
examines the literature on the subject of proliferation and supply networks with a 
review of recent cases.  In addition, Chapter II provides a primer to 
understanding the basic characteristics and steps involved in developing nuclear 
and radiological weapons.  Through the use of case studies, Chapter III will 
examine attempts by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons and 
radiological materials.  Chapters IV and V examine the applicability of traditional 
Cold War strategies such as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive 
diplomacy in the present context to deny extremist groups and associated 
networks the means to buy, steal, or make nuclear and radiological weapons.   
xvi 
The author concludes this thesis with the belief that the race against 
nuclear terror can be won if policy makers and the intelligence community take a 
multi-dimensional approach in developing mixed-strategies that are more nimble 
and responsive to dynamic threats.  A two-part framework is presented at the 





































"Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there 
would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance." 
  -- Winston Churchill1 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider traditional strategies such as 
deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy and assess their 
applicability to counter the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  In the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of mass-destruction has 
raised security concerns to an unprecedented degree not seen since the end of 
the Cold War.  Gone are the days when the U.S. concentrated its efforts against 
a single rival superpower.  As a principal adversary, the Soviet Union has been 
replaced by terror networks applying asymmetric warfare to achieve politically 
charged or ideologically driven objectives.  Previous research has concentrated 
on a singularly defined threat: The Rogue State.  Today’s challenges are 
characterized by more defused, decentralized networks, to include transnational 
actors with the potential to proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon 
or weapons-grade radiological material.  Despite US expenditures of over $86 
million to help nearly 30 countries world-wide in preventing the smuggling of 
weapons-useable radiological materials, over 20 known cases were reported 
between 1992 and 2001.2  The author contends that terrorist groups cannot 
acquire nuclear or radiological technology without the witting or unwitting support 
of state actors.   
                                            
1 Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: Roving Commission (London: The Reprint Society, 1944), 245. 
2 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation,” 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02426.pdf, (May 2002): 34-39. 
2 
A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Terrorism experts have long considered the sub-national threat in nuclear 
terrorism3 but al Qaeda’s shift in strategy to attack the “far enemy” has brought 
the prospect of mass-violence to the forefront in the minds of U.S. policy-makers 
and senior leaders.4  With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and the ubiquity of information technology, the potential to access such 
destructive capabilities on a global stage has never appeared more likely.  As 
one leading expert has said, “for the first time in human history very small groups 
have, or will have, the potential to cause immense destruction.”5  For the purpose 
of this thesis, the author will use the US government’s definition for terrorism 
defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.”6 
To focus the scope associated with the term WMD, we must start with 
defining what constitutes “weapons of mass destruction.”  In a recent Foreign 
Affairs article, Ashton Carter, professor of science and international affairs at 
Harvard University, writes: 
The term WMD generally applies to nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons; ballistic missiles; and, more recently, ‘dirty 
bombs,’ ordinary explosives containing some radioactive material.  
But this definition is too broad.  Chemical weapons are not much 
more lethal than conventional explosives and hardly deserve the 
WMD label.  Similarly, long-range ballistic missiles are especially 
destructive only if they have a nuclear or biological warhead, and 
should be considered a separate category.  Dirty bombs cause 
                                            
3 See Brian Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1975; and Thomas 
Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” International Security, Spring 1983, Vol. 6 No. 4. Retrieved 
from JSTOR on 4 May 05. 
4 Marc Sageman. “The Global Salafi Jihad,” The 9/11 Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, 9 July 2003, http://www.911commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_sageman.htm, (12 
June 05); for more details, see “The 9/11 Commission Report,” New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2004, 59. 
5 Walter Laqueur, “The Terrorism to Come,” Policy Review, No. 126 (August and September 2004), 
http://www.policyreview.org/aug04/laqueur.html (accessed on July 23, 2005); last section, para 8.  
6 US Department of State, “Pattern of Global Terrorism”, xii.  NOTE: The author explores the US 
government’s definition in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
3 
local contamination and costly cleanup but not true mass 
destruction; they too should be given lower priority.  The primary 
focus of counterproliferation policy, therefore, should be nuclear 
and biological weapons.7   
Implied by Carter’s statement is the diverse technical nature and military 
significance of each weapon.  The author argues that a one-size-fits-all policy 
would contradict the complex nature of grouping chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons under the banner of WMD.  Therefore, it is the 
author’s intent to focus this research in proposing a second look at applying 
traditional strategies to mitigate the threat of nuclear terror and the availability of 
nuclear and radiological weapons.  Finally, the author uses case studies and 
heuristics to develop a better understanding of traditional strategies applied 
against non-state actors specifically, proliferation, supply and terrorist networks. 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Until recently, contemporary thought on the cause of those who resort to 
terrorism was understood as disenfranchised individuals within society who 
sought violent means to gain attention for political grievances and social injustice.  
In the 1970s, Brian Jenkins, a top terrorism expert from the RAND Corporation, 
once argued that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people 
dead."8  Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, the attack on the Pentagon, and 
World Trade Center, terrorism was viewed as something that occurred 
elsewhere, in distant lands or in troubled regions.  Clearly these events 
awakened many within the U.S. to the horrors of domestic and international 
terrorism and brought the notion of instrumental violence to America’s shores.  
Consequently, analysts and senior leaders alike have sought various theories in 
order to help explain of how best to understand terrorism.  For this study, the 
author will refer to rational choice theory and social mobilization theory in order to 
analyze and explain the role of non-state actors.  The objective is to assess 
potential options and opportunities in which to shape potential strategies.   
                                            
7 Ashton B. Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 04, Vol 83 No 5, pg 73 
8 Brian Jenkins, “The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-5876, 
1977), 8. 
4 
1. Rational Choice Theory 
In its most basic form, rational choice theory is concerned with a micro-
level perspective of individual or group level motivation and decision-making.  
That is, the outcome of a given situation becomes more or less appealing 
depending on the “payoff” or “utility” (the benefits minus costs) of the end result, 




Table 1.   Rational Choice Theory (RCT)10 
 
The study of rational choice theory if often applied at the micro-level to 
explain the logic in individual decision-making.  However, rational choice theory 
may also be used to explain the collective action and decision of individuals to 
join, or abstain from joining, a terrorist group.  Decisions to join are often times 
predicated on personal interests, resources, or situational constraints.11  
Conventional rational choice theorists would argue that the “free rider” problem 
would appear counter-intuitive for an individual to join a terrorist group.  In 
essence, why should an individual join an extremist group and incur the potential 
cost when he or she could derive the same mutual benefits whether in the group 
or not?  That is, that the utility, or payoff, derived from a successful terrorist 
campaign would be shared by all of the group’s individuals, despite the level or 
extent of their participation in achieving organizational goals.  Martha Crenshaw 
counters this argument by suggesting that part of the answer is psychological.12  
                                            
9 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, (New York: Allison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers Inc, 1999), 16-21. 
10 Author’s adaptation of Rational Choice Theory as explained in Essence of Decision by Allison and 
Zelikow. 
11 Doug McAdam et al. Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
41-50. 
 12 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Origins of Terrorism by Walter Reich, (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 8-9. 
Application of Rational Choice Theory 
Utility = (Benefits – Costs) X Probability of Success (Choice n) 
5 
Further, she suggests that individuals participate in such activity as part of a 
collective action motivated by social factors such as kinship, friendship, and 
personal ties.   
However, rational choice theory is not only limited to understanding 
individual motives, but may be applied towards developing a framework in 
understanding the strategic level decision-making by actors pursuing specific 
courses of action.  To a great extent, the rational choice paradigm has dominated 
conventional thinking throughout the post-cold war period.  Thomas Schelling 
and Graham Allison have developed theoretical models to help explain the logic 
of decision-making by seemingly rational actors.  According to Crenshaw, 
Schelling suggests that “terrorism is one form of violent coercion, a bargaining 
process based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of 
overt force.”13  Taken to an extreme, nuclear and radiological weapons have the 
coercive potential to influence nation-state decision-making.   
2.  Social Mobilization Theory 
If we are to assume that terrorist actions are rational, then we should also 
consider their path to radicalization.  Understanding the dynamics of contention 
that compel individuals and groups to organize is essential to developing a basic 
strategic framework to counter extremist ideologies that promotes and advocates 
social change through violent means.  Likewise, critical analysis must also 
develop an understanding of a movement’s set of shared ideas, beliefs and 
values within a community or society that justify and enable such actions.  The 
study of social mobilization is concerned with these issues as well as the 
organizational, or meta-level, dynamics of individual and group development.  
Sidney Tarrow describes social movements as “those sequences of contentious 
politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective 
                                            
 13 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” in Inside 
Terrorist Organizations edited by David Rapport, 13, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
6 
action frames, which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges 
against powerful opponents.”14   
Scholars widely believe that terrorist groups emerge out of radicalized 
factions of a larger social movement.15  As Tarrow states, “violence is the most 
visible trace of collective action.”16  Social Mobilization Theory (SMT)17 enables a 
deeper and broader understanding of the path towards radicalization taken by 
terrorist groups. SMT provides a basic framework to integrate and analyze 
structural and rational actor models towards affecting the actions of non-state or 
sub-state actors.  In the war on terror, this level of study becomes more 
significant as policy-makers seek to develop strategies to affect, influence, or 
deter non-state actors.  In other words, to develop effective strategic options we 
must broaden our perspective from traditional theories of working from the top 
down or bottom up to one that analyzes from the group level out.   
                                            
14 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.  
15 Donna Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, (New York: University of 
Cambridge, 1995), 187-191. 
16 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 94. 
17 NOTE: Depending on the author, the term Social Mobilization Theory is also referred to as Social 
Movement Theory.  For the purpose of this thesis, the author applies the same meaning to both terms and 
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* SMT draws from other theories & re-applies them from an organizational perspective to analyze societal, 
group, & individual dynamics/influences.  Rather than a top down or bottom-up approach, SMT takes a 





Figure 1.   Social Mobilization Theory (SMT)18 
 
By applying a social mobilization framework we may begin the study of 
understanding the interrelationships and dynamics that are associated with those 
who promulgate violence and contention, the networks and alliances that are 
formed, and the cultural framing associated with packaging the justification for 
such extreme measures.  In this process, our objective is to analyze the various 
processes or moving parts that may be implicitly or explicitly “connected” with a 
movement or between networks.  A social movement in and of itself may be too 
big and diffused to analyze in its entirety.  For the purposes of this study we shall 
look at three key factors that shape an understanding of SMT: the structure and 
political environment, in terms of opportunities and constraints facing a 
movement; the mobilizing structures, wither formal or informal, available to 
members of a movement; and the collective process by which particular actions 
are interpreted or framed. 
                                            
18 Author’s adaptation from a collection of readings by della Porta, Crenshaw, McAdam, Tilly, and 
Tarrow. NOTE: Additional theories would most certainly apply; however, the intent of this model is to provide 
a simplified model view of how SMT fits among other theoretical tools. 
8 
C. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis uses a combined approach of case studies and heuristics to 
examine the applicability traditional strategies of coercive diplomacy, preemption, 
prevention, and deterrence against non-state actors.  The impetus for the 
concern over the possibility of nuclear terrorism is often attributed to two main 
reasons.  First, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and an economy in 
disarray led to increased opportunities for the proliferation of nuclear and 
radiological materials.  Chapter II examines the literature on the subject of 
proliferation and supply networks with a review of recent cases.  Furthermore, 
this chapter provides a primer to understanding of the characteristics and the 
basic steps involved in developing nuclear and radiological weapons.   
The area of concern leading observers to believe in the threat of nuclear 
terrorism is the belief that the real focus behind this “new” threat rests in the 
changing nature of political violence by extremist groups.  However, while the 
author accepts the notion that extremist motivations are a critical component to 
terrorism, this thesis will concentrate on the aspect of extremist motivations as it 
pertains to mass destruction.  Through the use of case studies, Chapter III will 
examine attempts made by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons and 
radiological materials.  Chapter III compares and contrasts the effort of Aum 
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda.19 
In Chapters IV and V, this thesis examines the strategies of coercive 
diplomacy, preemption, prevention, and deterrence in order to assess its 
applicability against networks and non-state actors.  Not since the Treaty of 
Westphalia and the creation of the modern system of nation states, has the 
international community faced a potential shift in foreign diplomacy.  The author 
argues that the rise of sub-state actors with the coercive power to destabilize the 
Westphalian system poses a threat not only to the United States but to the 
                                            
19 NOTE:  This chapter was previously published in Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 5, by the Center 
for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on May 2005.  A copy of article 
originally titled “Terrorist Motivations for the Use of Extreme Violence” may be found at 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/May/gomezMay05.asp.   
9 
primacy of nation-states within the international system.  As a result, the final 
chapter focuses on the application of strategies traditionally used between states, 
against non-state actors as way of understanding how they may be applied in 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
II. DEFINING NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: 
MASS DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION? 
A. OVERVIEW 
In recent testimony before Congress on national security threats both 
current and projected, Porter Goss, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 
stated that "it may be only a matter of time before al Qaeda or another group 
attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons."20  In 
fact, representatives from all the intelligence and national-security agencies to 
include FBI, DIA, DHS, and the State Department’s Intelligence and Research 
Bureau (INR) all agree that the question is no longer if, but when such an attack 
will occur.   As one leading expert has said, “for the first time in human history 
very small groups have, or will have, the potential to cause immense 
destruction.”21  While we may find solace in the fact that, since 9/11, the U.S. has 
not witnessed another major attack on U.S. soil, the lack of control of fissile 
material in the former Soviet Union, the potential of a nuclear Iran and North 
Korea, is of grave concern.  Adopting the position that the primary focus of 
counterproliferation policy should be reserved for a true weapon of mass 
destruction such as a nuclear and radiological weapon, this chapter will focus 
three key areas such as (1) the impact of coercive tools used by non-state actors 
such as suicide terrorism; (2) global nuclear proliferation; and (3) a look at the 
characteristics of what makes a nuclear weapon. 
B. TERRORIST MOTIVES 
For some extremists, suicide terrorism is a form of instrumental violence 
that serves as a coercive tool aimed at achieving specific political objectives.  
Similarly, one could argue that nuclear terror, like suicide terrorism, may serve a 
strategic purpose for terrorist organizations as a means to coerce governments 
                                            
20 Derek Reveron. “Security Surprises Pose Challenge,” CBS News, March 3, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/03/opinion/main677863.shtml (accessed on July 23, 2005). 
21 Walter Laqueur. “The Terrorism to Come,” Policy Review, No. 126 (August and September 2004), 
http://www.policyreview.org/aug04/laqueur.html (accessed on July 23, 2005). 
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to yield to specific demands.  While nation-states apply coercive tactics such as 
the threat of economic sanctions or conventional firepower as a means of 
compelling rival governments, terrorists are more likely to apply indirect 
approaches such as bombings or suicide terror as coercive tools.22   Thus, logic 
emerges that terrorist pursuit of nuclear weapons as a coercive tool may serve to 
further political and strategic objectives.  Therefore, to better understand the 
potential effectiveness of coercive tools used by terrorists, one can observe apply 
the experience of suicide terrorism as a means of determining future success of 
other weapons of terror.   
In a recent article, Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago 
explains five key observations on how terrorist organizations have assessed the 
effectiveness of suicide attacks and the limits of their coercive ability.  First, the 
author states that “suicide terrorism is strategic.”  He asserts that the majority of 
suicide attacks occur as part of an organized group in support of a broader 
strategic framework to support a greater goal.  Second, the “strategic logic of 
suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make 
significant concessions to national self-determination.”  Third, “during the past 20 
years, suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned 
that it pays.”  Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military 
forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, 
Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995.  These 
examples only seem to fuel perceptions that democracies lack the internal 
fortitude to sustain such extreme acts of violence.  Following this logic, the 
Madrid Bombings which occurred 3 days before a nation wide general election, 
resulted in the death of 192 civilians.  The dramatic events had an immediate 
impact on the Spanish elections and subsequent withdrawal of Spain’s troops in 
Iraq.   Published reports would later reveal that al Qaeda had a strategic intent in 
targeting Spain.  In a document posted on Islamist websites and analyzed by the 
                                            
22 Robert Pape. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 
3 (August 2003): 1-19. NOTE: Report covers a 21 year period from 1980 to 2001.   
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Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (NDRE) revealed that extremists 
believed Spain was “very vulnerable to attacks on its forces, primarily because 
public opposition to the war is total, and the government is virtually alone on this 
issue.”23 
Pape believes that “although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate 
concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to 
achieve still greater gains and may well fail completely.”  States may chose to 
abandon or concede short-term goals in lieu of any major concessions.  
Decisions that would have long term implications such as compromising the 
state’s overall security, significant loss of territory, or economic deprivation would 
be unlikely.  Secondly, the “most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to 
reduce terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target 
society.”  In this case, the goal is to build such a defense that the act of planning, 
preparing and executing a suicide attack is so formidable that efforts to acquire 
and detonate a nuclear bomb would be futile.  Although suicide terrorism is one 
tactics used by terrorists, other potential tactics would prove equally as difficult if 
not more so may include pre-positioning nuclear or radiological bombs in key 
locations such as major ports and waterways, transportation centers or key 
facilities in densely populated areas or cities.  Early theorists have identified the 
potential threat posed by terrorist in targeting nuclear reactors and power plants.  
As Graham Allison points out in Nuclear Terrorism, nuclear reactors may be 




                                            
23 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer. “Jihadi Strategic Studies,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Vol. 27, iss. 5 (2004): 368-369. NOTE:  The originator/author of this document is unknown but the NDRE 
believes al-Qaeda’s “Services Bureau” (maktab al-khidamat) is likely to have written the original text.  For 
more information on the document in its original form, see “FFI Explains al-Qaeda Document” at the 
Forsvarsnett website at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=71589. Last accessed 
September 23, 2005. 
24 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 
2004), 196-198. 
14 
C. GLOBAL PROLIFERATION 
On March 11, 2005, United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan 
addressed the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security  in 
Madrid, Spain that if extremists carried out a nuclear attack, “it would not only 
cause widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy 
and thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty."25   His speech, presented 
on the first anniversary of the Madrid bombings, underscores the concerns 
shared by many within the international community.  Closer to home, the 9/11 
Commission revealed that al Qaeda had “tried to acquire or make a nuclear 
weapon for at least ten years.”26  Then Director for Central Intelligence George 
Tenet warned that “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing 
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) materials.”27  Yet how 
would terrorist groups acquire such weapons?  Which is more realistic?  That a 
terrorist, buy, steal, or make a nuclear weapon?   
In the 1970s, experts argued that terrorists would not try to maximize 
casualties; instead, they were more inclined to employ violence in a limited way 
to sufficiently coerce concessions from governments.  As stated previously, Brian 
Jenkins once argued that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of 
people dead."28  This long-held view was later supported by other terrorism 
experts such as RAND colleagues Peter de Leon and Bruce Hoffman who at the 
time believed that the “vast majority of terrorist organizations are not particularly 
innovative” but that the innovation that has occurred has been in the choice of 
                                            
25 Adnkronos, “UN: Conference Seeks to Close Nuclear Loopholes,” Adnkronos International, July 6, 
2005, http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.184137838&par=0 (July 28, 2005).  
NOTE: In a speech before 100 delegates from 90 naitons, the Secretary General considered preventing a 
nuclear attack as “perhaps the most important thing of all.” 
26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company Inc, 2004), 380. 
27 Ibid., 380.  
28 Brian Jenkins, The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-5876, 
1977), 8. 
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targets rather than in the use of sophisticated weapons.29  At the time, the belief 
was widely held that the use of such weapons would appear inconsistent with 
terrorist objectives and that a large attack causing massive casualties would lead 
to alienation from the very audience from which they wish to recruit or, at a 
minimum, influence.30  
Since 9/11, the landscape has changed and few terrorism experts would 
suggest that there are not at least some extremists who do want to inflict mass 
casualties. In that context, nuclear terror not only represents an effort to 
intimidate and coerce, but also poses a critical threat to states and the global 
community.  With regards to nuclear proliferation, today’s problem is an 
outgrowth of three key events.  First, the break-up of the former Soviet Union led 
to a tremendous lack of control over the security and accountability of fissile 
material.  Second, despite states who have chosen to de-proliferate, there are 
still those who, for their own interests, have chosen to continue the pursuit of 
fissile and nuclear technology.  Finally, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, 
A.Q. Khan, accelerated the availability of nuclear technology and fissile material, 
by running a global nuclear “Wal-Mart” that introduced the world to a new, more 
prolific kind of black market.   
1. Post-Cold War Russia 
The lack of control over fissile material in Russia after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union became a fear in the 1990s.  Having the world’s largest stockpile of 
weapons-grade and weapons useable nuclear materials, highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) and plutonium (Pu), Russia is of particular attention to the world 
community.  According to the Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., Joseph Cirincione 
states that: 
 
                                            
29 Peter de Leon and Bruce Hoffman with Konrad Kellen and Brian Jenkins, The Threat of Nuclear 
Terrorism” A Reexamination, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, N-2706, 1985), 4. 
30 Peter de Leon and Bruce Hoffman, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination. 12.  
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Reliable estimates of the total Russian nuclear material stockpile 
vary, some running as high as 150 metric tons of plutonium and 
1,500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium.  Of this material, 
approximately 700 metric tons are thought to be in nuclear 
weapons.  The actual amount of material produced and held by 
Russia will never be known with certainty since the production of 
plutonium and other materials cannot be fully accounted for even in 
the best of circumstances (the United States’ own accounting has a 
margin of accounting error of 1 metric ton).31 
Based on IAEA standards, Russia’s stockpile would translate to 60,000 
highly-enriched uranium grade and 18,750 plutonium grade nuclear weapons or 
37,500 plutonium grade nuclear weapons by U.S. DOE standards.32  The 
numbers are staggering when one considers the destructive potential.  
Complicating matters further is the difficulty associated with securing the large 
quantities of such fissile material.  The graph below compiled from data derived 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reflects the number of total incidents involving radiological material 
of which is a number of cases involved weapons-useable materials.  Where 
possible, the author provides the country of origin corresponding to each case 
involving weapons-useable material.  Between 1992 and 2001, there were 20 
known cases of which 15 were confirmed or suspected to have originated out of 
Russia or former-Soviet states.  For a summary of each incident, please refer to 
Appendix B. 
 
                                            
31 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 115. 
32 Ibid., 37.  NOTE: To put this in perspective, the International Atomic Energy Association considers 
25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 grams of plutonium as highly significant.  The U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) states that only 4 kilograms of plutonium is all that is needed to produce a 
basic nuclear weapon.   
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Confirmed Illicit Trafficking Incidents from 1992-2001 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Incidents involving 
radioactive material 
(Source: IAEA) N/A 56 91 40 24 30 38 50 53 54 
Weapons-useable 
material (Source: 
GAO database) 1 3 6 3 0 0 0 2 3 2 
Source of Material 
traced to the country 











Russia 0 0 0 
(1) 
Russia 







Unk    
 
Note: Uranium enriched with 20 % or higher U-235 is considered weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 lbs. 
One thousand grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the weight of a paperclip. * In 1 of 2 
cases, Ukraine was also a possible source for this material. 
 
Table 2.   Cases and countries involving weapons-useable material33 
 
In reviewing the specific cases, much of the weapons-grade material can 
be directly used in nuclear weapons without the need for chemical reprocessing.  
According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Russia and 
Ukraine have had several cases in which attempts to smuggle nuclear-weapons-
useable material have been thwarted by authorities yet it remains unclear as to 
whether all material is accounted for.34 Despite efforts to secure such radioactive 
material, the fall of the former Soviet Union has resulted in a decrease in physical 
security, accountability, and control of sites throughout various facilities in the 
former Soviet republics.  Such concern raises the stake for the potential of illicit 
diversions by non-state actors, sympathizers to extremist cause, transnational 
                                            
33 Rensselar Lee, “Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy,” 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL31539, (October 22, 2002): 4-8; U.S. 
General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02426.pdf, (May 
2002): 33-39; and International Atomic Energy Agency, “The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB),” 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/ Features/RadSources/fact_figures2004.pdf, 2004.   
34 Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 116. 
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criminal networks, or desperate individuals with the desire to acquire sell nuclear 
material for profit or financial gain.35  
Despite the obvious gravity of the potential counterterrorist threat, nuclear 
experts have recently stated that “they (now) consider the danger more distant 
than immediate….  This is not due to the absence of such attacks, but because 
terrorists face technical and logistical obstacles, most notably in their attempts to 
acquire nuclear weapons.”36  However, the potential for excess material to wind-
up in the hands of a black-market proliferators, terrorists, or state actors looms 
large and until standards for securing and accounting of such hazardous material 
improves the likelihood that potential terrorists to learn through trial and error 
cannot be ignored.  Once again, the debate is ensconced by the notion that 
terrorists must overcome certain technical and logistical challenges in order to 
use such devices.  However, in a recent speech, Bruce Hoffman argues that “al 
Qaeda’s ability to change is reflective of their determination, adaptiveness, and 
resiliency.”37  His words appear to reflect that al Qaeda itself is a learning 
organization.  If given the opportunity, in time such as determined organizations 
may overcome what appears today as obstacles.38  In fact, even in the early 
literature critical of the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the possibility of such an 
act cannot easily be easily discounted.   
2. State Interests 
Adding to the challenge of proliferation is the desire by state-actors to 
acquire a nuclear capability.  These motives have remained unchanged.  In his 
essay, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” Scott Sagan explains how 
states determine and justify the need to build or not build nuclear weapons.  
                                            
35 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, 130-131. 
36 Jane’s Intelligence Digest, “Nuclear Threats in 2005,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, posted January 12, 
2005 at www.jid.janes.com (accessed January 15, 2005). 
37 Lecture presented by Dr. Bruce Hoffman on 2 Dec 04 at The New York University Center on Law 
and Security, sponsored by the New America Foundation.  Last accessed on 27 May 05 at 
http://newamerica.net/ index.cfm?pg=event&EveID=430  
38 NOTE: A recent two volume study by the RAND Corporation title Aptitude for Destruction (MG-331 
and MG-332) explores the subject of organizational learning by terrorist groups in much greater detail.  
19 
Sagan presents his theory using three basic models that is best summarized by 
the following:  
’The security model,’ according to which states build nuclear 
weapons to increase national security against foreign military 
threats; ‘the domestic politics model,’ which envisions nuclear 
weapons as political tools used by individuals and organizations to 
advance their parochial interests; and ‘the norms model,’ under 
which nuclear weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons 
development, is determined by the symbolic role of such weapons 
in a state's modern identity.39   
Over 20 years ago, Thomas Schelling wrestled with the link between the 
state and terrorism where the genuine use of or pretended nuclear capability in 
itself would reflect a state who, through its actions, appears to “descend” to the 
status of a terrorist organization.40  However, Schelling explains that: 
An organization other than a national government that possesses 
or could credibly claim to possess nuclear weapons conversely 
might “ascent” to the status of government.  It might seek its own 
permanence a nuclear mini-state, even if lacking territory.  Or it 
might claim a territory or seek a homeland, identifying itself as the 
rightful claimant to the legitimate authority in some existing state.41 
Such coercive potential places the onus on states to consider, that the 
threat of nuclear terror posses a challenge to the Westphalian construct as duly 
recognized states.  Schelling goes further by not ruling out the possibility of 
terrorist organizations gaining the “status and ‘prestige’ that are supposed to go 
with the fearsome accomplishment of producing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear 
bomb…can achieve diplomatic recognition.”42  Placed in this context, the 
question about what to do with excess nuclear material would appear to extend 
beyond non-proliferation and to policies reducing the number of states who 
                                            
39 Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 1 (Winter 1996/1997): 55. 
40 Thomas Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism, International Security, Spring 1983, Vol. 6 No. 
4. (Retrieved from JSTOR on 4 May 05), p. 68.  
41 Ibid., 68. 
42 Ibid. 
20 
produce radiological materials.  Such an approach would be aimed towards the 
eliminating the creation of additional nuclear-capable states.   
In a more recent article, Ariel Levite analyses the factors that led countries 
to de-proliferate and discontinue their programs. (See Appendix A for a 
breakout.)  Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa renounced their 
pursuit of nuclear development by opening all of their nuclear facilities to 
inspection in accordance with the Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA.43  In 
doing so, these states agreed to not acquire nuclear weapons, and not to assist 
non-weapon states from developing their own nuclear capabilities, while agreeing 
to international inspections for the purposes of verifying compliance.44  In return, 
these states would receive compensation in the way of favorable economic 
incentives as well as assistance in developing commercial nuclear power.45   In 
summary, Levite argues that states decide to discontinue pursuit for a number of 
reasons.  He states that common to each of these examples is: 
Some diminution of the perceived utility of nuclear weapons either 
because (1) the external security situation of a state improves or 
alternatives to nuclear weapons emerge that make them 
unnecessary; (2) a change occurs within the domestic regime and 
the state’s security and/or economic orientation (central planning 
vs. market economy); or (3) systemic or state-specific incentives, 
such as new norms, emerge that diminish the appeal of nuclear 
weapons.46 
While states have multiple reasons to de-proliferate, others like North 
Korea and Iran believe that it is in their best interests to go nuclear.  According to 
Dr. Richard Falkenrath, former deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President 
Bush, believes that “states have powerful incentives against initiating NBC 
(nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons use in war against similarly armed 
                                            
43 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Nuclear Weapons Status,” Carnegie Endowment, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg (accessed March 17, 2005). 
44 Carl E. Behrens, “Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues,” Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, Order Code IB10091, (January 13, 2005): 3. 
45 Ibid., 4-5. 
46 Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again”, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), 68. 
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adversaries.  The risks of retaliation in kind, hostile reaction, domestic political 
backlash, and moral opprobrium serve as effective brakes on such highly 
destructive acts.”47  In accepting this point of view, however, states that chose to 
directly support terrorist activities by providing nuclear or radiological materials 
directly would do so at their own risk.  This would also assume that the risks 
described have a direct affect within a state’s domestic constituency and 
international community.  A state that desires support from its international 
neighbors or concerned with internal unrest such as the case of Moammar 
Khadafi and Libya would be more likely to be influenced by such factors as 
suggested by Dr. Falkenrath.  In contrast, terrorist networks do not share the 
same constraints as state actors.  In fact, according to the Saudi Cleric Shaykh 
Nasir Bin Hamd Al-Fahd who issued his fatwa in May 2003 to justify the use of 
WMD, advocates the “permissible” use a bomb that can kill 10 million people as 
legitimate.  Among states, North Korea, with its application of coercive measures 
as a way of conducting diplomacy, poses a different threat.  The potential for a 
future Nuclear Black Market cannot be understated.  
In sum, the challenge to the Westphalian construct of nation-states would 
be impacted by the coercive potential of non-state actors in acquiring a true 
weapon of mass destruction.  While regimes like the IAEA were created to set-up 
control measures to manage who enters and exits the nuclear arms club, non-
state actors who are determined to acquire a nuclear weapon may take 
advantage of the materials that lie in facilities with minimum security or those 
vulnerable to the insider threat.  As of December 31, 2004, over 650 incidents 
involving uncontrolled radioactive were confirmed by the IAEA who believes that 
about 30% involved nuclear material while 60% of these incidents were other 
radioactive material.48  The same report points to about half of the number of 
incidents involving criminal activities such as theft, smuggling, illegal possession, 
or attempted sale of the material.  At the same time, non-proliferation and de-                                            
47 Richard Falkenrath et al. America’s Achilles’ Heel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 28. 
48 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB),” 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/ Features/RadSources/fact_figures2004.pdf, 2004. 
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proliferation are two different constructs and attitudes with regards as to how to 
handle the nuclear question, to go or not to go nuclear.  States motivated by their 
own interests, such as the case today with North Korea and Iran, only add to the 
growing potential for continued proliferation problems in the future.  The case 
where a transnational criminal network meets a terrorist network may not be too 
far off.  
3. The First Nuclear Black Market 
By the early 1970’s, Pakistan faced a strategic dilemma when India, 
Pakistan’s key adversary, divided Pakistan into two by recognizing Bangladesh.  
In 1965, Pakistan’s foreign minister at the time declared that “If India builds the 
bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our 
own.”49  An arms race in South Asia ensued.  By 1987, Pakistan was able to 
produce a nuclear weapon.  In between rose a network of financiers, importers 
and front companies orchestrated by the A.Q. Khan who led the creation of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program.   
His international network provided a unique sophisticated service that 
combined the proliferation of highly sensitive technology with the knowledge, 
skill, and ability to allow a country to jump start the development of its nuclear 
weapons program.50  In recent reports, one Pakistani official publicly admitted 
that A.Q. Khan sold “crucial” equipment such as centrifuges, a crucial component 
used to enrich uranium and produce fissile material for nuclear warheads.51  
While there’s been no direct link to connect A.Q. Khan with selling nuclear or 
fissile technology to non-state actors, the proliferation and existence of 
franchised version of the nuclear “Wal-Mart” cannot be discounted.  Yet, if we are 
                                            
49 Christopher Clary. “Dr. Khan’s Nuclear Wal-Mart,” The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Policy, 
March/April 2004, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd76/76cc.htm (accessed March 17, 2005). 
50 George J. Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” 
Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 24, 
2004,  http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/dci_speech_02142004.html (accessed March 
17, 2005).  
 
51 Paul Haven, “Pakistan Admits Rogue Scientist Aided Iran,” Guardian Unlimited, March 10, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-4856447,00.html (accessed March 17, 2005). 
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to compare the proliferation of fissile technology with other black markets, it is not 
too unrealistic to assume that other proliferation networks may take on the 
lessons learned and seek to start up their own program of their own.  For now, 
we can only assume that the vestiges of what was once a thriving network has at 
best gone underground and attention continues to focus on A.Q. Khan in 
discovering the extent of his network.  However, it is important to note that the 
conditions and permissive environment to which Dr. Khan exploited in support of 
his network may be difficult to repeat anew.  For example, the global community 
has become more attuned to such possibilities and has responded by adopting 
such measures as the Proliferation Security Initiative.52  Yet, as discussed with 
an official from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dr. Zachary Davis, 
a strong possibility exists that individuals who were once junior players during the 
peak of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market are today seeking financial gain and 
profiteering through similar means.53 
D. IN PURSUIT OF THE BOMB 
For a terrorist group to say that it wants to acquire a weapon of mass 
destruction such as a nuclear weapon is one thing, but to follow to follow through 
would require a great deal of planning and preparation.  During the inquiries for 
the 9/11 Commission, expert witnesses testified to the plausibility of a nuclear 
attack on the United States.  For example, in his testimony, renowned terrorism 
expert Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, stated that: 
The prospects of an attack against one of our nuclear facilities, 
rendering vast geographical or economic centers uninhabitable for 
hundreds of years, are no longer fiction but a possible future 
apocalyptic reality. Above all, the September 11th showed that 
when globalization meets extremist violence anything is possible for 
the future with threats of violence that can occur anywhere and 
                                            
52 NOTE:  The Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI will be discussed in more detail later. 
53 NOTE:  Author’s notes and discussions during the “Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks” 
Conference held at Naval Postgraduate School 29 June – 1 July 2005.  Additional reports on South African 
“Nuclear Underground” available at pbs.org’s Frontline on-line news information.  See 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/nuclear/ for more information. 
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anytime within our homelands with incalculable and unimaginable 
consequences.54  
Given the level of proliferation that exists and the strong possibility or 
inevitability of a nuclear North Korea and Iran, one must closely examine the 
plausibility.  As the U.S. currently finds itself engaged in operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, hostility towards the United States from the Islamic community 
remains high.55  Captured papers in the mountains of Afghanistan revealed plans 
by al Qaeda and the Taliban to pursue nuclear weapons.  No materials were 
found by the intent demonstrated a significant amount of nuclear weapons 
effort.56   
If al Qaeda or any other terrorist group for that matter were to recruit the 
proper skill sets, how difficult would be to make a basic nuclear weapon? The 
following section will serve as basic primer to understand the major components 
of a nuclear bomb as well as the characteristics of a nuclear bomb. The analysis 
presented will serve as a primer on the nuclear bomb as true weapon of mass 
destruction that is distinct from a weapon of mass disruption or “dirty bomb.”  
1. The Making of a Nuclear Bomb 
The key component in a nuclear weapon is fissile material.  Fissile matter 
is the key ingredient within a nuclear bomb that is made-up of atoms capable of 
splitting and fusing together at a tremendous rate.  The process of splitting and 
fusing together creates a vast amount of energy which occurs within a small 
fraction of a second before the central core of nuclear material is blown apart.57  
As Circincione explains, “To create a chain reaction, the core of nuclear material 
                                            
54 Magnus Ranstrop, “Statement of Magnus Ranstrop,” The Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, March 31, 2003, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing1/witness_ranstorp.htm 
(March 2, 2005). 
55 Edward Djerejian. “Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public 
Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World,” U.S. Department of State, October 3, 2003, 
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/24885.htm (March 5, 2005).    
56 David Albright. “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” The 
Nautilus Institute, November 6, 2002, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-
Forum/47_Albright.html (accessed March 22, 20005).  
57 Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37.  
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must be formed into a critical mass, meaning that enough fissionable material is 
in a sufficient small area to enable a self-sustaining fission” to occur.58  The level 
of purity of the fissionable material will determine the amount necessary for a 
nuclear bomb.  In other words, if a certain amount of weapons grade fissile 
material is 50% pure, more is required than compared to the same amount of 
material at 90% purity.  The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) 
considers 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 grams of plutonium as 
highly significant.  Uranium 233 (U-233), Uranium 235 (U-235), and Plutonium-
239 (Pu-239) are categorized as weapons grade fissile material with U-235 and 
Pu-239 serving as the primary material used to develop nuclear weapons.  Of the 
fissile material, only U-235 is found in nature but with a concentration level of 
about 0.7%.  In preparation for a nuclear bomb the fissile material must undergo 
an enrichment process.  U-233, Pu-239, and other radiological material must be 
created artificially in a nuclear reactor or re-processing facility. 
The process for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons 
grade Pu-239 is complicated and requires multiple steps, facilities, and technical 
capabilities.  States wishing to obtain HEU would either have to purchase these 
materials or by-pass international restrictions that prohibit nuclear explosions in 
order to build an independent capability.   To do so would require specific 
enrichment technology developed indigenously or obtained illegally.  Most 
exporters of nuclear materials would be less inclined to sell such material unless 
they were to be used for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear energy.59  That is 
why the proliferation of such technology by A. Q. Khan and his network was so 
significant.  As an example, the following is a list below gives a snapshot of some 
of the items that would be required to make HEU.   
 
                                            
58 Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37. 
59 International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), “The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” International Atomic Energy Association, June 12, 1968, Article IV, paragraph 2, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html (accessed March 23, 2005).  
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• Uranium deposits  
• Uranium Mine  
• A uranium mill (for processing uranium ore) 
• A conversion plant (used to process and purify materials) 
• An enrichment plant (to enable purified materials to be processed 
at a weapons grade level) 
• A capability of converting gases and other chemicals into solid 
uranium oxide or metal60 
The process for Pu-239 entails additional infrastructure and technical 
requirements such as a power reactor moderated by heavy water or graphite.  
In terms of making a nuclear weapon, the most basic design is the gun-
type, the type used over Hiroshima, is made from firing a projectile of HEU down 
a gun barrel against another piece of HEU creating a critical mass that leads to a 
chain reaction that causes a nuclear explosion.  The figure below depicts the 
basic concept of a gun-type bomb. 
 
Figure 2.   Gun-Type Nuclear Bomb61 
 
The main advantage of the gun-type nuclear bomb is in its simplicity 
providing the user with a high degree of confidence that the weapon will perform 
as intended.62  In fact, Hans Bethe, a technical expert on the Manhattan Project 
whose bombs were dropped over Japan during World War II, stated that the 
basic principles of a gun-type bomb were “’well taken care of’ by one scientist 
                                            
60 IAEA, “The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 35-43. 
61 DictionaryLaborLawTalk.com, “Nuclear Weapon Design,” 2004, 
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Nuclear_weapon_design (March 23, 2005). 
62 Graham Allison et al. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 55-60. 
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and two of his graduate students during a summer study at Berkeley.”63  
However, this design is only effective for uranium-based weapons and will not 
work with plutonium-based weapons.  
A second but more sophisticated method is the implosion device.  The 
implosion device is designed to compress a collection of subcritical sphere of 
nuclear material equally into a sphere sufficiently small to create a critical mass.  
The idea is similar to attempting to turn a basketball into a baseball with 
explosives.64  While the design may be more technical, it is, however, more 
efficient and allows for a more compact weapon to be utilized requiring less 
fissile material.  For comparative purposes, an HEU implosion requires “only 30 
pounds of HEU to match the 15-kiloton yield of Little Boy65.  Because plutonium 
is a more efficient fissile material than HEU, only 12 pounds was necessary to 
give Fat Man66 a 20-kiloton yield.”67  Unlike the gun-type which is limited to U-
235 only, implosion devises can by used for either U-235 or Pu-239.  A graphic 
representation is depicting the various stages before detonation and after 
detonation is provided in the figure below: 
 
Figure 3.   Implosion Design68                                             
63 John Holdren and Mathew Bunn. “Technical Background: A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and 
Nuclear Explosive Materials,” November 25, 2002, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical.asp (accessed March 22, 2005). 
64 Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37. 
65 NOTE: A gun-type bomb that was dropped over Hiroshima, Japan during World War II with a yield 
equal to 15,000 tons of TNT, or 15 kilotons. 
66 The bomb dropped over Nagasaki during World War II is an example of an implosion bomb. 
67 Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 59-60. 
68 DictionaryLaborLawTalk.com, “Nuclear Weapon Design,” part 3. 
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As stated previously, the International Atomic Energy Association 
considers 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 grams of plutonium as 
highly significant.  The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) states that only 4 
kilograms of plutonium and as little as 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is 
all that’s needed to produce a basic nuclear weapon.  In an implosion design 
would make maximum use of less material and, theoretically, you would be able 
to combine U-235 and Pu-239 to achieve a nuclear explosion.  Other methods to 
weaponize fissile material exist but entail greater sophistication and resources.  
The gun-type and implosion designs are some of the most publicized, the best 
known, and most probable.  Yet, according to Falkenrath et al, former weapons 
designers and experts in this field believe that small non-state actors could 
design simple explosive devices out of improvised materials to include uranium 
or plutonium oxides.  Likewise, arguments against the possibility of a non-state 
actor building a nuclear weapon are inclined to concentrate on the difficulties 
associated with implosion designs of the delivery and size of the weapon, issues 
for which a group building a basic gun-type weapon may not necessarily be 
concerned.69 
According to David Albright, former United Nations nuclear weapons 
inspector, "There is no indication that al Qaeda's nuclear work has gone beyond 
theory. To create a nuclear weapon…a designer must learn a whole set of 
manufacturing steps not mentioned in al Qaeda's manual and develop 
confidence in the weapon's design."70  However, the level of public knowledge 
about the various nuclear weapon designs has been available for at least 50 
years. In fact, the simplest nuclear design, the gun-type weapon, has continued 
to be used in various ways.  Before dismantling its nuclear program, South Africa 
had used this basic design and expected to gain a 10-18 kiloton yield if used.71  
Additionally, the proliferation of knowledge and capability has continued to 
                                            
69 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, 162. 
70 David Albright et al. “Bin Laden and the Bomb," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 58, no. 01, Jan/Feb 
2002, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf02albright_027 (July 23, 2005). 
71 Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 59. 
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expand and as technology improves the efficiency in which weapons are made, 
the “know how” of such capability will require less and less in-depth knowledge.  
For example, al Qaeda operatives did not necessarily need to learn how to take-
off and land a major jet liner; instead they simply needed to know how to control 
and navigate the aircraft while airborne.  The same principle may be applied to 
nuclear weapons that are missing and unaccounted for.  A little knowledge can 
go a long way. 
2. Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon 
As some experts have argued, for a terrorist group to make a nuclear 
bomb, it would require the assistance of individuals with experience in the design 
and construct nuclear weapons.  However, in the case of a gun-type of bomb, in-
depth knowledge may not be a pre-requisite.  According to Holden and Bunn, it is 
conceivable that a team of 3 to 4 people, with a solid, basic knowledge of 
physics, machining, explosives, and the chemical and physical attributes of the 
nuclear material using unclassified literature could, possibly, manufacture a 
nuclear bomb from weapons-grade material, without the need of prior nuclear 
weapons experience.72  However, acquiring all the material and expertise would 
still remain a challenge and given the complexity and infrastructure necessary, 
the most likely path for a terrorist group is to steal or buy a nuclear weapon vice 
developing an indigenous capability.  This fact alone demands a greater need for 
cooperative efforts to secure weapons to avoid and mitigate the probability of 
theft by potential terrorists.   
The three most widely accepted approaches are that terrorists groups may 
buy, steal or make the components that comprise a nuclear bomb.  However, as 
Falkenrath, Newman, Thayer point out, there are some key points that make 
acquisition of nuclear weapons possible: 
 
                                            
72 John Holdren and Matthew Bunn. “Technical Background: A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and 
Nuclear Explosive Materials – Part Two.” November 22, 2002, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical2.asp (accessed March 22, 2005), para 12.    
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First, all of the scientific information necessary to design a simple 
nuclear weapon is publicly available.  Second, the increased 
possibility of stealing, or acquiring it from smugglers, has lowered 
the most significant technical barrier to nuclear weapon acquisition.  
Third, with a sufficient quantity of pure HEU in metallic form, 
nuclear weapons design and construction required only limited 
resources, equipment, and expertise, and could be accomplished 
by many states and a few exceptionally capable non-state actors.  
Fourth, although building nuclear weapons with plutonium and non-
metallic or impure HEU would present greater technical challenges, 
it could be accomplished by many states, and would be possible for 
some non-state actors.  Finally, although an active effort to obtain 
fissile material exposes nuclear aspirants to considerable risk of 
detection by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the 
clandestine fabrication of a nuclear weapon has few distinctive, 
easily observable indicators.73 
To summarize the potential avenues a terrorist group may pursue in its effort to 
acquire nuclear weapons or radiological material, the following matrix highlights 
key issues and concerns: 
                                            
73 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, 126-137. 
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                                  Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon 
 Tech Knowledge Resources Risk Factors 
Buy - Low if weapon is 
bought in its entirety.      
- Low if major 
components are 
complete to assemble 
a gun-type weapon. 
- Sufficient Finances 
- Access to individual or 
group willing to sell 
- Desired path for a 
terrorist org 
- In general, low but 
need someone willing to 
sell 
-Susceptible to “honey 
point” stings  
Steal - Medium to High: 
Must have insider 
knowledge  or ability 
to exploit security 
vulnerabilities 
- Insider knowledge and 
access to targeted facility 
- Next best option for 
terrorist organization 
- Must overcome 
security measures to 
obtain materials, a 
daunting task in most 
cases. 
Make - Highest among all 
potential options 
- Requires ability to 
discern weapons 
grade material from 
radioactive material 
- Finances & technical 
expertise 
- May require multiple 
sources for ingredients 
- Most difficult for terrorist 
organization 
- Components generally 
difficult to acquire 
- Requires multiple skill 
sets/knowledge 
- Vulnerable/dependent 
on technical experts 
Table 3.   Comparative Approaches of Acquiring a Nuclear Capability.74 
 
Analyzing the chart further, one asks the question which path would 
terrorists most likely pursue?  In the following chapter the case studies involving 
Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda depicts the how both groups have attempted to 
acquire such a capability and each group, particularly Aum Shinrikyo has 
attempted to pursue each avenue above more specifically, in buying or making a 
nuclear weapon.  For the purpose of this study, the most ideal way for a terrorist 
is to buy of steal a nuclear weapon intact.  However, stealing a weapon requires 
a great deal of intelligence and insider knowledge of the security system 
involved.  Buying a weapon would also be just as challenging in that a terrorist 
                                            
74 Author’s matrix based on a selection of readings. 
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group must be able to trust the network, group, or individual from whom they plan 
to purchase the weapon from to ensure that what the have is real and not a hoax.  
Al Qaeda has experienced at least one instance in which millions was spent on 
purchasing a weapon that turned out to be false.   
The last of the three options to make their own weapon is the most difficult 
and would require sufficient amount of weapons-grade material.  In this case, a 
gun-type weapon would be the most simple of the designs.  If weapons-grade 
material such as highly-enriched uranium or plutonium is unavailable the process 
of enriching the uranium in itself is daunting and would be the least likely.  In 
sum, the likelihood that terrorist may take in attaining a nuclear capability would 
be as follows: (1) steal or buy weapons grade, highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium and develop a gun-type bomb; (2) steal or buy a nuclear weapon 
intact; (3) make or develop enriched material and construct a nuclear weapon.  
While the matrix in Table 3 concerns itself with the three ways in which 
terrorists may acquire a nuclear weapon, a fourth possibility of sympathizers 
providing a nuclear weapon to terrorist organizations must also be considered.  
According to Amitai Etzioni, professor of Sociology at George Washington 
University, “Pakistan ranks high as a state from which terrorists are most likely to 
be able to obtain ready-made nuclear weapons either by toppling its government, 
by cooperating with certain dangerous elements of the government, or by 
corrupting the guardians of the bombs.”75  As reported in a recent RAND study, 
suspicions that bin Laden had managed to recruit “pious scientist” from 
Pakistan’s nuclear program was reported in the media.76   The study quoting 
press reports, believed that scientists may have provided al Qaeda with a road 
map for building a nuclear bomb by naming key technology and suppliers willing 
to support the group’s effort.77  Suspicions persist that scientists, sympathetic to 
                                            
75 Amitai Etzioni, “Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism in a New Global Order,” The Foreign Policy Center, 
UK, October 2004, http://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/PreemptNucTerr.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2005), 12.  
76 Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Kinchasa Reactor, (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, DB-458-AF, 2005), 35. 
77 Ibid., 35 
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al Qaeda’s cause may have fled to southeast Asia to avoid questioning.78  The 
issue of de-proliferation among failing states while prohibiting new state to enter 
the nuclear club must also serve as a central issue for policy-makers to consider.  
The fourth option where an insider may provide or give a terrorist organization a 
nuclear weapon may easily shoot to the top as a likely scenario.   
E. U.S. STRATEGY AND POLICY  
The knowledge gained from understanding the extent of A.Q. Khan’s 
network is critical in our development of effective counterproliferation strategies.  
U.S. policy and strategy must be prepared to respond to underground networks 
who like transnational terror networks may very well have become more diffused 
and dispersed.79  The current national security strategy (NSS) acknowledges the 
need to give greater attention to global cooperation to meet current challenges.  
The NSS identifies three key pillars to U.S. Policy and Strategy: (1) 
counterproliferation to combat WMD use ~ reflects a domestic defensive posture 
to deter and defend the U.S. from attacks; (2) strengthen non-proliferation to 
combat WMD-proliferation ~ a strategy that concentrates U.S. efforts to working 
traditional methods of diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, export 
control, and threat reduction efforts; in here we see the use support for the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the most recent initiative Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI);80 (3) consequence management to respond to WMD use ~  
designed to put the onus on the U.S. government to prepare its citizens, military 
forces, and allies with the ability to respond in case of an attack.81  As a whole, 
                                            
78 Sara Daly et al, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Kinchasa Reactor, 13. 
79 John Arquilla et al., “Chapter 3: Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism” in Counter the 
New Terrorism, Ian Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 46.  
80 Sharon Squassoni. “Proliferation Security Initiative,” Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, Order Code RS 21881, (January 14, 2005): 3. NOTE:  PSI was signed in May 31, 2005 and is 
designed to work with other participating nations to interdict shipments of WMD.  According to the report, 17 
countries are signatories to the agreement with as many as 60 nations willing to support the initiative.  The 
major criticism of the program is the difficulty to measure effectiveness of the agreement.  In April 04, the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution that strengthened the agreement requiring all states “to criminalize 
proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.”  Once again, 
the challenge falls on nations willing to enforce such actions.   
81 George Bush. “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” US Department of 
State, December 2002, http://www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/ (March 17, 2005), 2. 
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this broad policy identifies the defensive characteristics of protecting the nation, 
but widening its scope to address the causes for terrorism should also be 
expanded upon.   
In the most recent National Defense Strategy signed by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 1 Mar 05, the Secretary states that the DoD “will 
place greater emphasis on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade others 
from acquiring catastrophic capabilities, to deter their use and, when necessary, 
to defeat them before they can be employed.”82  In executing these tasks, the 
Secretary emphasizes dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression 
and the use of counter coercion.  In the document, a continuing emphasis is 
placed on al Qaeda’s terror network; but the author believes that broadening the 
target set to expand beyond al Qaeda to include proliferation and supply 
networks may yield greater results towards mitigating the threat of nuclear terror.  
With so much focus on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, other potential terror 
groups remain underground.  The same can be said about A.Q. Khan.  With so 
much emphasis on the Pakistani scientist, other potential “franchised” 
proliferators may be operating and continuing where A.Q. Khan left off.  
Finally, according to The National Defense Strategy of America, 
continuing multilateral negotiations will help to deal with counterterrorism in three 
ways:  
First, in a few cases a multilateral resolution can provide a formal 
structure for making demands and implementing responses without 
the taint of being solely the work of the United States, or the United 
States and a few allies….  A second and less specific way…is that 
they reinforce and international norm against the use of terrorism….  
(Through the use of international conventions, multilateral 
negotiations) provide common standards that facilitate cooperation 
on certain matters.83 
                                            
82 Donald H. Rumsfeld. “The National Defense Strategy of America,” US Department of Defense, 
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83 Paul Pillar. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 
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To resolve group level problems we need to view it from a group level or 
movement level perspective.  It is at that point that we can start crafting more 
tailored solutions to resolve counter extremist threat.  Policy-makers engaged in 
a rational actor or structuralist framework must adapt to multi-dimensional 
aspects in meeting today’s challenges, specifically as they pertain to mass terror.  
As Dr. Mohammed Hafez, Professor of Political Science at University of Missouri 
and specialist and Islamic revivalism, cites the delicate balance of the western 
response and reaction to Islamist violence.  He believes that “misconstruing the 
underlying causes of Islamist rage or overacting to Islamist violence may only 
intensify militancy, not temperate it.”84  As such, U.S. policies must continue to 
emphasize multilateral efforts to work with countries, not against them, in dealing 
with internal challenges.  
F. SUMMARY 
In summary, the coercive potential of a nuclear or radiological bomb 
makes the threat of nuclear terror distinct from other forms of what is generally 
accepted as weapons of mass destruction.  As stated by Ashton Carter, makes 
the potential for mass-destruction greatest when compared to lesser or more 
limited destructive capacities.  As Carter states, “The primary focus of 
counterproliferation policy, therefore, should be nuclear and biological 
weapons.”85  Low-end weapons such as a radiological dispersal device or “dirty  
bomb,” while not requiring substantial effort to develop, would have a more 
limited overall effect in and would serve more as a weapon of disruption rather 
than a weapon of mass destruction.   
On the other hand, if terrorists were interested in creating a catastrophic 
effect by using a true weapon of mass destruction, a terrorist would opt to pursue 
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(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 199. 
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a nuclear weapon.86  The most likely path for a terrorist to obtain a nuclear 
device would be to steal or purchase the fissile material necessary to make a 
basic nuclear bomb.  Another concern is for a terrorist network to work with an 
insider threat to purchase a nuclear warhead from a country exploiting security 
vulnerabilities.  For example, U.S. officials are concerned about Pakistan where 
extremists have attempted to kill the country’s President Pervez Musharraf on at 
least two separate occasions.87   
Beyond stealing a weapon, a terrorist group may consider purchasing a 
weapon or radiological material from a non-state actor.  While a great deal of 
attention has focused on A.Q. Khan, one must also consider the possibility of 
other future variations of a new nuclear black market.  Nations who have proven 
the ability to produce nuclear technology, such as South Africa, are prime to have 
future A.Q. Khan proliferators following in his footsteps. The case of Iran and 
North Korea are good example of customers who may have benefited from a 
network like A.Q. Khan. 88  In contrast, for a terrorist group to purchase a weapon 
from a state-actor would be unlikely, with the possible exception of North Korea, 
which is known to be willing to proliferate weapons, knowledge, and capability.  
Another potential avenue is the threat posed by transnational criminal networks.  
According to Phil Williams, noted criminologist and professor of International 
Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, the threat posed by transnational criminal 
networks can take many forms.  For example, Prof Williams believes that 
opportunistic amateur groups may be motivated by greed and the desire for 
profiteering from the sale of fissile materials while others like ethnically based 
smuggling groups may not have difficulty in obtaining to acquiring and concealing 
                                            
86 NOTE: While the author would still consider chemical and biological weapons as forms of mass 
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87 Adam Erli, “Pakistan: Assassination Attempt on President Musharraf,” U.S. Department of State, 
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88 Bill Powell, “The Man Who Sold the Bomb,” Time Magazine, February 14, 2005, 
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radiological materials.89  Finally, the least likely is for terrorists to gain the means 
to develop a weapon form scratch.  To do so would, in all likelihood require state-
sponsored support due to the resources necessary.  
In closing, dealing with state-actors first is in the best interest of the global 
community.  The second approach is to develop strategies that are targeted to 
disrupt and degrade proliferation and terrorist networks.  The approach in dealing 
with both differs and these issues will be explored in Chapter IV.  In addition, the 
debate between non-proliferation and de-proliferation must and should be 
reconsidered.  The distinction between the two is critical in considering strategies 
that are preventive or pre-emptive in nature.  That is, non-proliferation may have 
a preventive element in that states who have the ability refrain from proliferating 
to those states or non-states actors either wittingly or un-wittingly.  At the end of 
the day, those states still have the potential to do so due to the fact that they 
possess the means.  De-proliferation, however, requires a state to give up a 
nuclear capability thereby reducing the potential of states, or more specifically 
non-state actors, from acquiring fissile material in the first place.  In return, states 
will have to address the core security issues that compel them to pursue nuclear  
weapons in the first place.  Such an effort will require a regional focus and global 
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III. CASE STUDIES OF EXTREMIST MOTIVATIONS FOR 
 MASS DESTRUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
For policy-makers, understanding the source or cause of discontent 
serves as the best hope to remedy the ills that lie beneath what some refer to as 
“sacred” terrorism or religious terrorism.  All too often, our analysis of extremist 
motives begins with our reaction to the terrorist act itself.  However, for certain 
extremist organizations, channeling efforts to identify and isolate the root cause 
for such events requires a deeper understanding of the intricacies that foment 
such profound actions, specifically suicide terrorism and the use of a weapon of 
mass destruction.  The effort is to better understand and compare the rationale 
behind the use of nuclear and radiological weapons.  If terrorists can be deterred, 
the effort here is to determine which strategies or sets of strategies may prove 
more effective. 
In a recent review by Jeff Goodwin of Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name 
of God, he stated that few studies probe deeply into the cause of terrorism and, 
as a result, “it remains a mystery.  A contributing factor is that social movement 
scholars with very few exceptions have said little about terrorism.  Nor have they 
paid sustained attention to the more general question of how movement 
organizations make strategic choices, of which terrorism is one.”90  As stated 
previously, to resolve group level problems one must to observe such issues 
from a group or movement level perspective.  It is at that point that we can start 
crafting more tailored solutions to counter the extremist threat.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the rationale behind terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction. A comparative analysis is presented through case studies of Aum 
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda.  The objective is to analyze the rationale and extent of 
                                            
 NOTE:  This chapter was previously published in Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 5, by the Center for 
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their actions in determining whether their effort to use nuclear or radiological 
weapons is one of strategic choice or group behavior.   
In brief, Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to attack civilians on a Japanese 
subway reflects an organization in a desperate fight for survival.  According to 
Martha Crenshaw’s organizational perspective, “terrorist actions often appear 
inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable” and terrorist acts occur as a result of 
internal group dynamics.91  The group’s ultimate decision to strike a Tokyo 
subway system was as much an attack on Japan’s political culture as it was an 
act by a desperate group.  In contrast, al Qaeda’s methodical planning and 
extensive preparation reflects an instrumental approach where the act of 
terrorism is that of strategic choice founded on the basis of collective values.  
According to Crenshaw, such an organization ultimately fails when the group is 
unable to reach its political objectives or when the cost of conducting such 
terrorist acts exceeds any foreseeable benefits.    
B. AUM SHINRIKYO 
Today, evolving before the global community are fears of continued acts 
of “megaterrorism” such as the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  
Authors such as Graham Allison, Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, and others 
have written about the prospects of such actions.  In fact, Thomas Schelling in 
1979 wrote that “Sometime in the 1980s an organization that is not a national 
government may acquire a few nuclear weapons…. By ‘organization’ I mean a 
political movement, a government in exile, a separatist or secessionist party, a 
military rebellion, adventurers from the underground or the underworld, or even 
some group of people merely bent on showing that it can be done.”92  Through 
his description, Schelling argues that distinctions exist between terrorist groups.  
If terrorist groups are distinctive in their motives, it would stand to reason that in 
order to deter or influence such organizations, one must also be able to isolate 
and differentiate the group’s goals and objectives from their rhetoric.  For 
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example, in comparing the Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo to al Qaeda, we 
find distinctions in orientation and ideology, yet both are often characterized by 
the use of religious extremism to serve ideological objectives.   
1. Background 
Before the events of 9/11, Aum Shinrikyo unleashed fears of extreme 
terror with the release of sarin gas in a Japanese subway in 1995.  Led by a 
religious mystic, Shoko Asahara, followers of the movement had come to believe 
that “Armageddon will come at the end of this century and…only a merciful, godly 
race will survive.  The leader of this race will emerge in Japan.”93  Asahara, 
characterized as charismatic, highly ambitious individual, methodically built a cult 
that, at its peak, reached 40,000 members world-wide with an estimated 30,000 
followers in Russia and other areas to include Australia, Sri Lanka, and the 
United States.94  The group capitalized on millennial visions and apocalyptic 
predictions to frame their group’s doctrine which was deeply influenced by the 
works of Nostradamus; his work serves as a cornerstone of the group’s 
teachings.95  Aum’s followers actively recruited students and professionals in the 
fields of medicine, science, computers, engineering, and other technical areas.  
Asahara’s charisma and message seemed to have a great appeal to many who 
felt alienated by the industrialized, secular, and conformist aspects of Japanese 
society.96   
2. Motivation 
At its peak, it is estimated that Aum Shinrikyo’s worth was as much as 
$1.5 billion.97  With such great financial resources, Aum Shinrikyo invested 
capital to support high-tech, state-of-the-art laboratories and funded its own 
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research circumventing restrictions normally associated with larger corporate 
research laboratories.98  In addition to collecting monies through donations, 
tithing, and sales of religious materials, Aum conducted seminars and courses in 
the cult’s teachings charging hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars to 
participate in these sessions.  In fact, Aum Shinrikyo diversified its enterprises by 
running a chain of restaurants in Tokyo as well as owning a computer 
manufacturing firm that assembled and sold computers in Japan with parts 
imported from Taiwan.99  Other more surreptitious practices included the 
manufacturing of illegal drugs that was supported by the Japanese mafia (the 
Yakuza) with a marketing agreement.  Further, Aum engaged in a practice 
referred to as “green mail” where Aum would extort community leaders by 
threatening to establish a “branch” office or school within their local community.  
By engaging in such practices, the cult succeeded in gaining leverage through 
extortion, coercion, theft, and murder as a form of fund-raising for the cult.100   
Asahara and his closest followers planned to defend themselves against 
the coming Armageddon by creating a formidable arsenal that would enable Aum 
Shinrikyo to survive and become the most powerful group in the world.  Despite 
high expectations and several attempts at local elections, Asahara and other 
leaders failed to gain a seat in the Japanese parliament.  The result seemed to 
have radicalized the core leaders even more resulting from unmet expectations 
and the group’s goals in changing Japanese political culture.  He would later 
preach that it was “the duty of Aum members to hasten Armageddon” and 
subsequent efforts to attack the Japanese legislature also were indicative of 
Aum’s disappointments with the democratic system.101   
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3. Opportunity 
While the group’s most notorious act involved the release of sarin gas, 
Aum attempted to acquire various types of other weapons to include biological, 
nuclear and radiological material.  The cult’s close relationship with followers in 
Russia positioned Aum Shinrikyo to leverage its vast wealth, contacts with 
Russian security forces, and dealers in the black-market yet failed to acquire 
weapons-grade fissile material.102  Aum remained open to all alternatives but in 
the end chose to develop chemical weapons. Yet, the cult’s endeavors to acquire 
a nuclear capability were not without desire and effort.  Aum invested a great 
deal of time and resources in its attempt to purchase advanced weapons.  
According to a recent RAND study, Hayakawa Kiyohide, a senior Aum leader, 
made eight trips to Russia in 1994 and with a budget of $15 million sought to 
acquire a nuclear bomb.103   
Despite efforts to bribe senior Russian officials with exclusive access to 
foreign technologies markets, Aum failed in its quest to purchase a nuclear 
weapon.104  Aum actively sought to recruit scientists and employees from 
Russia’s Kurchatov Institute and Moscow State University to join the cult.105  At 
one point, Aum leaders requested but were subsequently denied a meeting with 
the then Russian Energy Minister Victor Mikhailov to discuss the purchase of a 
nuclear warhead.  Undaunted the group later pursued efforts to build a nuclear 
weapon by collecting required materials and mining uranium in Western Australia 
from land purchased by the group.106  Their plan was to construct a bomb in 
Japan with plans to enrich the uranium by using lasers.  Despite Aum’s vast 
wealth and contacts Shoko Asahara and his followers eventually abandoned their 
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efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb and chose to pursue a less difficult, less costly 
option that was also less destructive. 
Ultimately, Aum chose to pursue the chemical option and made several 
attempts with limited results between 1990 through 1995 leading up to the attack 
of the Japanese subway in Tokyo.  Asahara and his core leaders would soon 
discover that, days prior to the subway attack, local authorities and law 
enforcement personnel had plans to conduct police raids against cult facilities 
and offices.  However, until this point, Aum had succeeded in exploiting Japan’s 
extensive legal protections for religious organizations which enabled Aum to 
operate in a highly permissive environment without much interference from the 
state.107  By March 20, 1995, however, Aum’s leaders realized that the case 
against their group by Japanese authorities was sufficient to its leaders.  Asahara 
became convinced that his arrest along with other senior cult members was 
imminent and believed that the only strategy that remained was a pre-emptive 
attack to strike fear as a last act in order to ensure the group’s survival.  Despite 
having limited success in its previous efforts with chemical agents, Aum had 
believed that a successful attack would have sufficient psychological impact as to 
secure the group’s future.  In the end, what remains clear is that Aum displayed a 
great deal of resolve in its effort to employ tactics that would cause mass-
casualties.108 
The perceived response by Japanese authorities compelled Asahara and 
his inner circle to go further underground.   From Aum’s perspective, this act 
improved the cult’s chances for survival while reducing the likelihood of death or 
capture, particularly among the group’s leaders.  Going underground would 
isolate the movement from the outside world would limit the opportunity to add 
new recruits or replenish losses.  Additionally, this action had the added effect of 
further radicalizing the group’s tactics and ideology.  As a result, Aum’s behavior 
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began to reflect the internal dynamics of the organization rather than the pursuit 
of a specific strategic objective.109  The group began to develop a tight identity, 
social connections and interpersonal bonds that a sense of cohesion.  It 
intensifies the group’s resolve to move toward more violent activity.110  The 
organization’s decision-making began to reflect the group’s internal dynamics 
and group think eliminates decision within the leadership’s inner core.  Loyalty to 
the peer group took on a more profound meaning and an important motive as 
activists shifted toward a deepening commitment to the cause.111  Survival was 
seen as at stake and the group became more willing to use extreme violence to 
counter any perceived threat to its existence.   
4. Summary 
Within the context of Aum’s value system, the cult’s actions appear logical.  
When faced with the real threat of capture by Japanese authorities, Aum’s 
leaders had come to believe they had no other alternative but to strike.  Despite 
previous failures, the group had committed itself to developing and using 
chemical toxins as their primary instrument of extreme violence. Arguably, 
however, Asahara’s initial choice to purse the development of nuclear weapons 
is owed more to the fascination in the use of technology than a rational decision 
to use lower cost alternatives.  Ultimately, Aum, in terms of weapons of mass 
destruction, sought a less catastrophic alternative in using chemical weapons.  
By March 1995, Aum had believed it had no other option but to reject Japanese 
society and confront authority.  Asahara had believed that his group’s survival 
was at stake.  One can argue that Aum sought an indirect approach to counter 
society’s overwhelming preponderance of military and law enforcement forces by 
resorting to indirect methods.  In failing to reach its goal of achieving political 
power through legitimate means, the group’s leadership decided that a pre-
emptive strike was their best and only option.  In 2000, the group was renamed 
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Aleph meaning to start anew, but has yet to relinquish its ties with Shoko 
Asahara.  According to a New York Times article, when asked about its 
relationship with Asahara, Aleph’s current leader Fumihiro Joyu, stated that "Just 
like you wouldn't stop your connection with physical fathers and mothers who 
commit a crime, we will not sever our connection with our spiritual father."112  
C. AL-QAEDA  
Similarly, one can draw parallels between Osama bin Laden and the 
development of antisystem frames used by al Qaeda to provide ethical 
justification for violence against civilians.  For example, as previously mentioned 
Osama bin Laden’s, manifesto Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, where he 
states his three major grievances with the United States; first, the presence of 
forces in Saudi Arabia; the second, U.S. Israeli alliance; third, corrupt Arab states 
whose failure to organize and inherent weakness allows for Israel to continue to 
exist.113  With the basic frame set, Osama bin Laden call for the jihad to be 
carried out the “far enemy.” 
1. Strategic Framing 
By tapping into a view supported by a broad public, bin Laden attempts to 
draw support from among the greater Muslim community.  His message strives to 
appeal to a wider global audience and rally a Muslim population of over 1 billion 
people to al Qaeda’s cause.  His effort is intended to reduce the psychological 
cost of participating in a radical cause or terrorist organization.  In an article by 
della Porta, the author states that “The ideology of the terrorist organizations 
offered (1) a justification of political violence, including murder; (2) an image of 
the external world that masked the failures of the armed struggle; and (3) a 
positive evaluation of the role of individual action.”114  Similar to Aum, al Qaeda 
has drawn from those sympathetic to its cause.  Bin Laden has leveraged 
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common cultural frames and religious ones to serve as part of the group’s 
strategic ideological objectives.  Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must 
distinguish and separate between religious and ideological factors that shape the 
group’s short-term and long-term objectives.   
Unlike Aum, however, al Qaeda’s influence has extended to groups with 
known or alleged connections to al Qaeda including the Jemaah Islamiyah in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya in Egypt; Harakat ul-Maujahidin in Pakistan; the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia; Jaish-e-Mohammed in India and Pakistan; and, al-
Jihad in Egypt.115  But the distinction between al Qaeda and its regional 
surrogate groups differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the 
concerns by these various groups are more local.  Likewise, these local groups 
have gone to considerable lengths to justify their support to the local population 
and would be less inclined towards resorting to mass violence.  While they may 
agree that an attack on the U.S. is justified, a similar response locally would be 
counterproductive to the group’s cause.  Yet, to the extent that these corollary 
groups support al Qaeda directly or through more passive means, knowledge 
and understanding of the overall network is critical to determining the groups’ 
vulnerabilities and potential opportunities to influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt 
threats of extreme violence.   
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such 
religious zeal serves a useful purpose to promote the group’s ideological 
objectives as well as justifying the use of collective violence.116  According to 
Hafez, “Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political 
and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate 
repression on the other.  When states do not provide their Islamist opposition 
movements opportunities for institutional participation, and employ repression 
indiscriminately against these movements after a period of prior mobilization, 
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Islamist will most probably rebel.”117  Hafez describes how radical Islamists 
organize themselves and demand strict ideological and behavioral adherence of 
each of their members.  In a similar way, Aum used threat, fear, murder, and 
intimidation to mitigate dissention within the group.  This radicalized view, 
however, further isolates the organization from the rest of society. 
2. Spiral of Encapsulation  
The increased radicalization produces a “spiral of encapsulation” that 
gradually isolates Islamists rebels from the broader movement.  That is, an 
organization whose continued isolation and increased radicalization causes the 
group to turn more extreme in their views thus becoming more fanatical or 
militant towards society at large.  Such extremism increases moral justification for 
its cause while inducing a separation from the greater society.  To be successful 
“Organizers of violence must align their tactics with cultural norms, symbols, and 
ethics that give moral meaning to acts of violence. Culture provides a “tool kit” of 
concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant organizations could selectively 
draw to construct strategies of action.”118  However, if a society places a 
premium on such sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and 
reinforcing extreme use of violence such as suicide terrorism.  Thus, martyrdom 
and suicide terror becomes the weapon of choice for producing mass violence.  
Academics would argue that mass terror, like suicide terrorism, serves a strategic 
purpose and is considered a coercive tool by terrorist organizations.  While  
nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional firepower 
as a means of coercion, terrorists increasingly use suicide terror as the 
instrument of choice.119   
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative 
weapon combined with variants on a familiar tactic of hijacking, bombing, and 
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martyrdom as suicide terror in a highly innovative way doctrinally.120  Like Aum, 
al Qaeda expressed a strong interest and effort in acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction. In fact, bin Laden has called the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) as a ‘religious duty.’”121  Ayman al Zawahiri, leader of the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) expands bin Laden’s views by stating that the 
objective of the global jihad against the United States and its allies is to:  
(1) To inflict maximum casualties against the opponent. 
(2) To concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most 
successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least 
costly to the Mujahedin in terms of casualties. 
(3) Targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be 
chosen to have an impact on the structure of the enemy. 
(4) To reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be 
feasible at this stage.122 
 
3. In Pursuit of Weapons 
Al-Qaeda’s emphasis on the ‘far away enemy’ gave members of the World 
Islamic Front a common focus.123  Yet despite al-Qaeda’s effort to acquire CBRN 
materials, why have they not launched an unconventional attack using WMD?  
As reflected above, al-Qaeda’s leaders had a strong desire to obtain 
unconventional weapons.  In fact, al-Qaeda devoted an entire volume of their 
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5,000-page “Encyclopedia of Jihad” to methods by which chemical and biological 
weapons may be developed and constructed.124  
Like Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda demonstrated evidence of intent and desire 
to self-develop highly destructive weapons.  During operations in Afghanistan, 
US led coalition forces discovered traces of ricin and anthrax at five or six 
sites.125  Additionally, evidence and video tapes were discovered demonstrating 
group’s interest in bubonic plague, cyanide, and botulinum toxin which was also 
unearthed.  The tapes included video-training manuals for terrorists instructing 
them on how to assemble explosive devices.  The tapes also show chemical 
tests being performed on three dogs.  In one scene, a group of unidentified men 
are seen leaving an enclosure in which the dogs are penned.  A few moments 
later, a white gas appears to seep in from the left, when, after a few seconds, the 
dogs begins to display physical reactions.126   
According to a report prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
in January 5, 2003, seven men were arrested in London, UK for producing ricin in 
an apartment.  British authorities indicated that at least one of the individuals 
arrested had attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.  It was later 
discovered that the remaining individuals had undergone similar training in 
Chechnya and Georgia. Within a week, five more men and one woman were 
taken into custody for involvement in the plot.127  Additionally, Abu Khabab who 
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was a known al-Qaeda operative was identified as the man responsible for 
training members of the plot in London.128 
In April 2004, Jordanian authorities arrested 6 individuals and killed 4 in a 
raid to pre-empt a pending attack by small cell linked to Abu Musa al-Zarqawi 
who allegedly provided $170,000 through messengers from Syria.129  According 
to a witness testimony, suspects were found with instructions on preparing germ 
and conventional weapons.130  The cell’s plan was to conduct a suicide attack 
using trucks filled with 20 tons of industrial chemicals and explosives to crash 
into the Jordanian intelligence agency headquarters in the country’s capital of 
Amman.  The original plan called for simultaneous attacks against the U.S. 
Embassy as well as the prime minister’s office.  The estimated number of 
casualties were anywhere from as low as 20,000 up to 80,000 lives.131   
Finally, in August 2004, 8 men were arrested in the UK and charged with 
“conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, providing material support and 
resources to terrorists, and conspiracy to damage and destroy buildings used in 
interstate and foreign commerce.”132  They were discovered with information on 
chemicals, explosives, and radiological materials. Their plans were to target U.S. 
financial institutions to include the Citigroup Building in New York, the New York 
Stock Exchange, the Prudential Building in New Jersey, and the International 
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C.  The arrests occurred two weeks after a 
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series of 13 arrests of individuals allegedly affiliated with al-Qaeda network.133  
Those members arrested included Dhiren Barot (aka “Moussa al-Hindi“ and Abu 
Esa al-Britani”), head of the al-Qaeda in Britain “who gets his orders directly from 
Osama bin Laden,” and Muhammed Naeem Noor Khan of Pakistan, “an alleged 
al-Qaeda operative” whose computer proved instrumental in the case.134 
4. Summary 
In the three examples presented, we find certain common themes.  First, 
the majority of the targets were selected for their symbolic value.  In particular, 
the plot in Amman, involved the group’s plan for martyrdom/suicide attacks. The 
use of suicide terrorism was a strategic choice for maximum effect against a 
symbolic set of targets aimed at Jordan’s relationship with the United States.  
Second, in each case at least members had either trained with or received 
financial from al-Qaeda.  Third, each assault was planned with the intent of 
having multiple simultaneous attacks.135  Finally, as presented in the case of the 
terrorist plot in Amman, Jordan, small groups may resort to using conventional 
materials to achieve an unconventional effect.136  These examples illustrate the 
prospect of independent cells conducting more diffused yet potentially lethal 
terrorist attacks.  The most recent attacks against London’s citizens and transport 
system, only validates the continued use of such tactics.  Most alarming, was 
evidence indicating that these attacks were carried out by British citizens.                                                
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In sum, al-Qaeda’s influence today appears to be more inspirational than 
tactical.  Yet, the potential exists that new groups may “copycat” the tactics used 
by al-Qaeda. As John Parachini, a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, 
points out, terrorist cells will exploit permissive environments that give extremists 
the opportunity to access and, in some cases, develop their own chemical 
weapons, the most accessible.  As part of a state’s counterterrorism effort states 
will have to become more aware that law enforcement regulations used to protect 
the individual rights may also be exploited by unscrupulous individuals.137   
Secondly, terrorists will still have to overcome technical challenges whether 
nuclear or chemical.138  Since the crackdown of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 
2002 by Pakistani authorities, none of al-Qaeda’s associated group appears to 
be developing chemical and biological weapons.139  Finally, the leader’s mindset 
and intent is critical.  However, the individual cell leaders in the previous 
examples were not Shoko Asahara or Osama bin Laden.  In order to survive, 
terrorist groups will be more independent or cellular in for and less command-
driven by groups, a move influenced more by need than strategic intent.140 
If attacks do occur, they may be similar to the attempt in Amman, Jordan.  
Efforts would continue to focus on conventional material used and applied in an 
unconventional way.  As Giles Kepel argues in his book Jihad written before 
9/11, Islamic Fundamentalism was on a path of decline.  If so, the events on 
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September 11, 2001 could be interpreted as an effort to resuscitate a dieing 
movement.  Future attacks may involve desperate acts to gain further fuel for the 
movement.  As the President reconsiders a shift in its policy towards the global 
war on terrorism141 US objectives should be (1) to help its decline by means of 
non-proliferation/counter-proliferation in securing sensitive materials and 
mitigating the vulnerabilities of key areas and locations such as nuclear plants, 
ports, and large gatherings; and (2) simultaneously focus our effort to resolve the 
source of contention for the root causes for terrorism must ultimately find a 
resolution through non-kinetic multilateral/multidimensional means.142       
D. STRATEGIC CHOICE OR GROUP BEHAVIOR 
Martha Crenshaw emphasizes the importance of analyzing how terrorist 
group behave as a key process in developing effective policy 
recommendations.143  She develops two approaches to better understand 
terrorism and its consequences.  The first approach argues that terrorism 
represents a strategic choice from a set of possible alternatives by a political 
actor.  Behaving on a set of collective values, an organization may choose 
terrorism to achieve radical political and social change.  This instrumental 
approach is viewed as a response to government behavior and actions.  The 
corresponding view is that as cost for conducting such activity increases or as 
the reward for such actions decreases, violence will be less likely to occur.  The 
instrumental perspective takes a basic rational approach of cost/benefit analysis 
in choosing terrorism.  
The second approach emphasizes the internal organizational process 
within a particular group or across similar groups who have common objectives.  
The emphasis is on the internal dynamics of a group where leaders offer 
incentives to individuals or control their actions to discourage defection of dissent 
                                            
141 Glasser, Susan B., (29 May 05), “Review May Shift Terror Policies,” last accessed on 20 Jun 05 
located at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/28/AR2005052801171_pf.html  
142 NOTE: By multilateral the author means either through direct support with regional state-actors and 
multidimensional to include diplomatic, economic, and informational means. 
143 Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” 14 and 25. 
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within the organization and foster intense loyalty.  In effect, the actions of this 
type of group may not correspond to the organization’s stated political objectives 
and more reflective of an erratic organization displaying unpredictable behavior 
showing more of a struggle of survival rather than activity that supports 
ideological objectives.  Such a group would be more inclined to change internal 
incentives towards individuals in response to perceived threats from external 
pressures applied to the organization.   
1. Similarities and Differences 
How then would this apply to the Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda?  The 
author will first compare the similarities of both organizations.  
 
Similarities 
• Amassed a great deal of wealth and financial resources 
• Global reach and access to external funds and support 
• Pursued efforts to purchase nuclear weapons and radiological 
materials 
• Strong interest and pursuit of WMD: well resourced/strong 
desires 
• Self-developed and experimented with chemical weapons; 
the easiest to make and the least deadly  
• Expressed political objectives and a call for change 
• Followers influenced by charismatic leadership 
• Discouraged by the state apparatus/desire for radical change 
• Operated within “permissive” environments 
• Followers were not of one specific class or social strata 
• Displayed ability to adapt and leverage existing technology 
Table 4.   Similarities between Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda144 
 
With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the most telling comparison 
is the desire and financial resources to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, 
                                            
144 Author’s assessment based on a collection of readings listed in this chapter. 
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or nuclear weapons.  Both organizations believed that violence can achieve 
political change and both believed in the possibility that terrorism was an 
effective means to that end.  However, as we compare the differences between 
both organizations, we begin to draw distinctions in their decision-making that 
reflects Crenshaw’s original supposition regarding instrumental and 
organizational approaches. 
Differences  
Aum Shinrikyo Al Qaeda 
• Manufactured/synthetic belief system 
• Used a chemical/biological weapons 
• Concentrated on WMD despite 
failures 
• Attacked from within 
• Reacting to pending strike 
• Remained in country of origin 
primarily 
• Relied on internal technical 
knowledge & expertise for WMD 
programs 
• Sought to mine & manufacture fissile 
material 
• Ran for political office and lost 
• Utilized pre-existing cultural and 
religious frames 
• Abandoned WMD and adapted a 
modified approach of proven tactics in 
a highly innovated way 
• Developed/tested chemical weapons 
• Attacked from afar  
• Comprised of members from an exiled 
community (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.) 
• Relied on networked strategy to 
achieve effect 
• Sought external support for nuclear 
weapon 
• Demands on revamping the political 
system and secular construct 
 
Table 5.   Differences between Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda145 
 
2. Observation and Analysis 
Drawing from these conclusions, we begin to see the contrast between the 
organizations.  While Aum expressed political change as their ultimate desire, its 
decision-making reflected more of an organizational survivalist construct in 
achieving its ends.  Unlike al Qaeda, Aum became focused on using a weapon of 
terror to achieve its objectives.  This obsessive fixation continued despite 
                                            
145 Author’s assessment based on a collection of readings listed in this chapter. Monterey, CA. 
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numerous experimental attempts and failures.  Aum’s leaders appeared almost 
unconstrained by their own ego and driven to validate their extensive investment 
in research and equipment by using chemical weapons.  In contrast, al Qaeda 
abandoned its effort only after repeated attempts failed to achieve desired 
outcomes leading the group instead to modify known capabilities, bombing and 
hijacking, with the intent to improve their chances of success.  In keeping with a 
more instrumental approach, al Qaeda has maintained its focus on 
accomplishing its operational objective despite alternating the specific tactical 
means of doing so.  Although al Qaeda had the wealth, resources, and contacts 
necessary for such a venture its leaders decided to pursue other alternatives to 
achieve the desired effect.  However, what both examples show is that despite 
wealth and connections problems still exist in pursuing weapons of mass 
destruction.   
A second key observation is the difference in how each organization 
framed its cause.  Al Qaeda leveraged existing sentiments and feelings shared 
among a large majority of the Muslim world.  The leadership within al Qaeda 
drew upon widely shared beliefs that the roots of the Muslim world’s problem lie 
with the continuing influence of the West in Islamic affairs.  His message had a 
broad appeal because it resonated with existing cultural, religious, and societal 
beliefs.  Al Qaeda’s leaders hijacked existing beliefs to satisfy ideological 
objectives.  In contrast, Aum’s belief core was wholly manufactured, i.e., 
synthetic in its origins.  First, while Asahara dabbled in the practices of Hinduism, 
his syncretistic belief structure was pieced together out of various religious and 
non-religious beliefs, to include the writings of Nostradamus.  Second, unlike 
individuals who are immersed in a predominantly Islamic culture, Aum 
Shinrikyo’s teachings were not necessarily reinforced by everyday surroundings, 
societal contacts and interactions.  Unless a follower of Aum lived in one of its 
communities, individuals were susceptible to external influences.  To some 
degree, this constraint contributed to the need to suppress dissent within the 
group.   
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E. SUMMARY 
The likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-
9/11 era remains unclear.  However, the scale of attack on 9/11 suggests that 
despite the technical challenges, groups will continue to expend efforts in 
possessing a capacity to cause extreme violence whether through conventional 
or unconventional means. Increasingly, terrorism experts and specialists in social 
movement theory, suggest, more effort and dialogue between academic and 
government communities is necessary to understanding the role of extremism 
and source of contention behind groups that may spawn from social 
movements.146  This would help policy-makers identify and distinguish groups 
who approach terrorism from an organizational or instrumental perspective.   
Pressures applied to a group dominated by internal dynamics would 
compel the organization to implode by isolating the particular individual goals 
versus political ideology.  This is best exemplified in the discussion of Aum 
Shinrikyo above.  Within the context of Aum’s value system, the cult’s actions 
appeared logical.  Their rejection of Japanese society is best illustrated in their 
preemptive response to pending raids by Japanese authorities.  In lieu of 
achieving political power through legitimate means, the group ultimately sought 
to achieve its objective through extreme violence.  In contrast, a group choosing 
terrorism among other alternatives will calculate actions based on perceived 
benefits and costs.  This approach would suggest that presenting a set of 
different alternatives as substitutes or increasing costs to the degree that any 
benefits gained by terrorist in using extreme violence would not be sufficient to 
achieving political objectives.   
In the case of al Qaeda, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was 
simply a part of the range of options available for instrumental purposes.  Aum’s 
obsession with WMD technology combined with the permissive environment of 
                                            
146 Notes by the author from conversations with Dr. Doug McAdam, a Stanford University professor of 
sociology, Dr. David Rapoport, a UCLA professor of political science and editor of the Journal of Terrorism 
and Violence, and Dr. John Arquilla, a professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School 
during recent conference on held on 5-7 April 2005, at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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the Japanese legal system enabled Asahara’s followers to pursue WMD 
technology despite numerous failed experiments.  Today, changes in the legal 
system and law enforcement techniques would make the duplication of Aum’s 
extensive WMD acquisition program more difficult.  In other words, the changes 
adopted by Japan’s legal system and experience gained from Asahara and his 
cult have raised the costs and risks of pursuing such tactics, thus mitigating the 
likelihood of replicating Aum’s program in Japan.   
Since the events on 9/11 and for groups who follow al Qaeda, an attack 
using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons has yet to be seen. 
But, the potential is undeniable.  Technical challenges will remain an issue in the 
short-run which will make conventional weapons applied in an asymmetric 
approach a primary means to cause mass disruption.  As a result, the long-term 
goal should be continued emphasis on enforcing constraints and controls on the 
proliferation of sensitive materials to include commercially available fissile matter 
and not solely weapons-grade material.  Experts contend that a radiological 
dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb,” a combination of both conventional 
explosives with low grade radiological material, is a greater threat than a nuclear 
weapon.147  However, future terrorist groups may examine both cases and draw 
from them the next most probable course of action.  For example, where Aum 
failed to hire the expertise necessary for a nuclear weapon’s program, an 
instrumentalist group like al Qaeda may stand a better chance of recruiting 
Islamic extremists with the requisite skills.   
Secondly, some argue that Islamist groups like al Qaeda are on their way 
out.  If this is the case, what would preclude a group from following Aum 
Shinrikyo’s model of resorting to extreme violence with the use of a more 
catastrophic weapon?  In either case, the goal should be to aim towards 
eliminating a terrorist’s hope for success by shoring up defenses and deterring 
the proliferation of WMD technology.  Eliminate the means and you reduce the 
likelihood of a mass attack.  Yet eliminating the means may serve as an effective 
                                            
147 Peter Zimmerman, “Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited,” 1-3. 
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goal for a preventive strategy, it fails to address other approaches that can 
influence or effect other strategies such as pre-emption, deterrence, and coercive 
diplomacy.  Denying the means is ineffective against terrorist who may already 
possess a nuclear or radiological weapon.  As such, the following section will re- 
examine traditional strategies applied against states in an effort to redefine what 
it means to coerce, deter, pre-empt or prevent non-state actors from acquiring 
nuclear and radiological weapons.  
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IV. MITIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM: 
 U.S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider traditional strategies such as 
deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy and assess their 
applicability to counter the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  In the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political violence 
expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an 
unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War.  As one leading 
expert has said, “for the first time in human history very small groups have, or will 
have, the potential to cause immense destruction.”148  Former U.S. Senator Sam 
Nunn states, “Combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons is the most pressing issue that we face today.”149  Senator Nunn 
maintains that the possession of such weapons “by rogue nations or terrorist 
groups could pose a clear and present danger to our society.”150  Often, the 
impetus for concern about nuclear terrorism is attributed to the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, which some contend has led to increased opportunities for 
the proliferation of nuclear and radiological materials.   
However, another perspective is that the real focus behind this “new” 
threat rests not so much with proliferation, but rather in the changing nature of 
political violence by extremist groups.  Experts in the field have long considered 
the sub-national threat in nuclear terrorism151 but al Qaeda’s shift in strategy to 
attack the “far enemy” has brought the prospect of mass violence to the forefront 
                                            
148 Laqueur, “The Terrorism to Come,” last section, par. 8.  
149 Cameron, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century,” 152. 
150 Sam Nunn, “Senator Nunn’s Valedictory,” Speech reprinted in Air Force Magazine, December 
1996, Vol. 79, No. 12, http://www.afa.org/magazine/dec1996/1296nunn.asp, (10 June 05).  
151 See Brian Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1975; and Thomas 
Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” International Security, Spring 1983, Vol. 6 No. 4. Retrieved 
from JSTOR on 4 May 05. 
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in the minds of U.S. policy-makers and senior leaders.152  Indeed, directing 
nuclear anti-proliferation policies solely toward states may have limited effect in 
influencing transnational actors. Instead, policy makers should expand policy 
considerations against transnational networks with the potential for proliferation.   
How might traditional strategies for mitigating the threat of nuclear 
proliferation—prevention, deterrence, coercive diplomacy and pre-emption—
apply to non-state actors prone to extreme political violence, including terrorist 
groups?  More specifically, how might traditional strategies for mitigating the 
threat of nuclear proliferation already undertaken by states mitigate proliferation 
of nuclear/radiological materials and weapons to radical social movements, and 
in particular, violent vanguards that such social movements spawn?  Prevention 
remains the first and foremost strategy to deny terrorists the means of obtaining 
nuclear and radiological materials or their support networks the ability to 
proliferate.  On the other hand, deterrence is concerned with dissuading terrorists 
from trying to acquire nuclear weapons or radiological materials.  In addition to 
preventive and deterrent strategies, a combination of mixed-strategies to include 
coercive diplomacy and preemption can have an impact but in very specific 
situations.  The shortfall will continue to be intelligence but a better way to 
analyze the likelihood for violence is to analyze how the message relates to the 
broader social movement and what inspires movements to spawn violent 
elements.  Further, a meta-level perspective, as discussed in Chapter I, would 
allow for ground level view of what resonates with the affected audience.   Such 
a methodology would enable a better opportunity to selective target specific 
audience with greater precision enabling traditional strategies of pre-emption, 
prevention, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy to be more effective.   
 
 
                                            
152 Marc Sageman. “The Global Salafi Jihad,” The 9/11 Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, 9 July 2003, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_sageman.htm, (12 
June 05); also, see “The 9/11 Commission Report,” New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, 59. 
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1. Key Terms and Definitions  
As stated previously, part of the challenge in establishing a clear definition 
for terrorism lies in how the term, as a concept, is perceived by others.  For 
example, as stated in Chapter I, the U.S. government has defined terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience.”153  The term “noncombatants” refers to civilians and 
unarmed or off-duty military personnel.154  In addition, the term international 
terrorism refers to “terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one 
country.” A terrorist group is defined as “any group practicing or that has 
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.”155  State sponsors of 
terrorism are described as those that provide funding, weapons, materials, and/or 
social or political space for planning and conducting operations.  Currently, the 
U.S. government has designated six countries as state sponsors of terrorism: 
Libya, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Iran.156   
While the State Department’s definition of terrorism includes the key 
component of political violence aimed against civilians, it also includes the notion 
that the act of terror is a role limited to sub-national actors or clandestine agents.  
However, the definition falls short to include terrorism as a tool used by states as 
an instrument of coercion and control against civilians.  Although the six 
countries listed above are classified as state sponsors of terrorism, states that 
have used violence as means of suppressing discontent or repressing 
                                            
153 US Department of State, “Pattern of Global Terrorism”, xii.  NOTE: In an interview with Dr. Rohan 
Gunaratna (10 May 05), he describes the basic components of terrorism as a “threat or act of politically 
motivated violence against non-combatants.”  Key emphasis is politically motivated violence as opposed to 
criminal activity or random violence.  This assumes a level of purpose or rational behind a violent act.   
154 Ibid., xii. Located in the footnote section at bottom of the page.  NOTE: The term non-combatant is 
one that is widely debated, particularly as it pertains to military members out of uniform but it also includes 
states such as Israel where extremists have used the pretext “that all Jewish citizens, including women, 
served in the national army” for justification as legitimate targets in suicide attacks by .  See Giles Kipel, 
Jihad, (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
155 Ibid. 
156 US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” US Department of State, April 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/c14813.htm, (10 Jun 05). 
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contentious politics may also be considered as a form of terrorism targeted 
against its population.  Such extreme measures as violence against a population 
may be interpreted as a form of terrorism.  Examples of such acts include 
Chinese repression of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square and 
measures adopted by Abdul Nasser in Egypt to minimize the rise of extremists by 
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  The repressive policies and 
measures by Abdul Nasser’s government would serve as a catalyst for groups 
like the Muslim Brotherhood to justify political violence against the state, in this 
case the Egyptian government, giving rise to violent social movements.157 
2. State Sponsors, Rogue States & U.S. Policy 
The primary focus of U.S. policy is to concentrate counterproliferation and 
WMD efforts against nations who may provide assistance to nations identified as 
state sponsors of terrorism.  However, the nuclear challenge posed by 
transnational criminal and terrorist networks further complicates counterterrorism 
efforts which are already complex and challenging.  In a joint session before 
Congress, President Bush declared that the US “will pursue nations that provide 
aid or safe haven to terrorism” and that “any nation that continues to harbor or 
support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”158  
As a result, the following four principles were drafted and have become the 
guideline that shaped U.S. national counterterrorism strategy: 
                                            
157 NOTE: The rise of violent social movements aimed at the United States has been interpreted as a 
reaction of US policy and support for countries that appear to use repression as a means of control.  
Extremist groups such as al Qaeda fault the US for supporting what Jihadist consider bad governments.  
Aside from the most recent bombing in the tourist resort town of Sharm el-Sheik bordering the Red Sea, 
terrorist have chosen to attack the far enemy as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks in the US, the bombings 
in Madrid, Bali, Casablanca, and most recently London.  
158 Office of the Press Secretary, (20 Sept 01), The White House, “Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress & and the American People,” last accessed on 12 Jun 05 at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html  
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• Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals 
• Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes 
• Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism 
and force them to change their behavior 
• Booster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries 
that work the United States and require assistance159 
However, if rogue states are the principal target to counter the potential 
threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism, what are other potential targets of 
influence?  What other key player(s) can or should be considered in the quiver of 
potential targets where deterrence, prevention, pre-emption or coercion could be 
applicable?   
To explore such questions, it is useful to first consider what benefit 
extremists might derive from resorting to asymmetric means.  In the RAND study 
titled, Countering the New Terrorism, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele 
Zanini developed a three-fold construct to define the challenges posed by non-
state actors and terrorism in an effort to propose how best to tackle these issues.  
The first is terror as a form of coercive diplomacy or, more specifically, a means 
“to persuade others, by means of symbolic violence, whether to do something, 
stop doing something, or undo what has been done.”160  The second is the 
adoption of a “war paradigm” which arises “when weaker parties cannot 
challenge an adversary directly and thus turn to asymmetric methods.  A war 
paradigm implies taking a strategic, campaign-oriented view of violence” where 
the “aim is to inflict damage, in the context of what the terrorists view as an 
                                            
159 Department of State, “Pattern of Global Terrorism”, pg. ix. 
160 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age 
Terrorism,” in Countering The New Terrorism by Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, 
Michele Zanini, and Brian Jenkins, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 68. 
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ongoing war.”161  Finally, the third is the “new world” paradigm where motivation 
is “driven by religious mania, a desire for totalitarian control, or an impulse to 
chaos” reflecting more of a millenarian movement as an off shoot of small groups 
led by a prophet in pursuit of “salvation by seeking a final violent cataclysm.”162  
Regardless of the type of motivation, a group choosing to employ WMD has two 
key considerations:  1) message to a target audience and 2) obtaining material.  
Thus, in the case of WMD, the target set may expand beyond state-sponsors and 
terrorists to include proliferators and the broader population who may not directly 
support terrorist group by providing tacit support.   
B. COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGIES? 
 In subsequent sections the author examines traditional strategies in 
determining their applicability to non-state actors.  Specifically, the author will 
assess the meaning of coercive diplomacy, preemption, prevention and 
deterrence in the context of sub-state actors.  The focus is to realize whether or 
not current policies could benefit in developing strategies that go beyond state 
sponsors of terrorism and include various transnational networks.  The objective 
is to understand the benefits of any one strategy against another in an effort to 
assess whether individual or mixed strategy is more effective in countering 
transnational networks.  If so, which combination or set of strategies would prove 
most effective?  For each strategy, we shall examine the theory and practice of 
each followed by an analysis of its applicability against non-state actors. 
1. Coercive Diplomacy 
As a concept, coercion has been often employed throughout the history of 
international diplomacy with mixed results.  However, the general intent of 
coercive diplomacy is to place a demand on an adversary backed by a credible 
threat of punishment for noncompliance.  The threat should be sufficiently potent 
                                            
161 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age 
Terrorism,” 69. NOTE: Rogue states may apply this strategy to compensate for a lack of conventional forces 
to impact or influence larger nation-states.  In this context, terrorism provides a mechanism through which 
rogue states can affect other groups or states.  This concept will be discussed further in the case of Libya 
under coercive diplomacy.   
162 Ibid. 
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to persuade the opponent that it is in his/her best interest to comply with the 
demand.  Coercive diplomacy is considered a “defensive” diplomatic strategy that 
relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force to achieve the 
objective.163  Where deterrence attempts to dissuade an adversary prior to the 
initiation of an action before it has begun, coercive diplomacy is in response to 
something that has occurred.164  If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic 
efforts at persuasion, it is employed in “an exemplary manner,” by way of limited 
military action in order to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to 
higher levels of military action if necessary.165   
a. Theory 
As a strategy, coercive diplomacy is implemented to challenge an 
adversary’s efforts and to shift the balance to a more advantageous or desirable 
position.  In order to do so, George characterizes the various strategic options or 
types of defensive objectives into the following three types:   
 
                                Coercive Diplomacy 
Deterrence Type A Type B Type C 
Persuade opponent 
not to initiate an 
action 
Persuade opponent to 
stop short of the goal 
Persuade opponent to 
undo the action 
Persuade opponent to 
make changes in 
government 
Table 6.   Three Types of Defensive Coercive Diplomacy.166 
 
                                            
163 Alexander George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 2.  
164 Alexander George, “Forward,” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy edited by Robert Art 
and Patrick Cronin, (Washington, DC,: United States Institute for Peace, 2003), pg. vii. NOTE: In his later 
writing, George also refers to coercive diplomacy as compellence.  However, in his previous writings, 
George draws a distinction between coercive diplomacy and compellence based in that compellence (1) 
does not “distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of compellence;” and (2) the “concept of 
compellence implies exclusive or heavy reliance on coercive threats, whereas (George) wishes to 
emphasize the possibility of a more flexible diplomacy that can employ rational persuasion and 
accommodation as well as coercive threats to encourage the adversary to comply with the demands or to 
work out an acceptable compromise.”  Quote is located in George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2. 
165 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2. 
166 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 9. NOTE: George characterizes offensive coercive 
diplomacy as compellence or blackmail strategy. 
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Type A is limited to merely stopping your opponent’s action; Type B 
is characterized as a more ambitious aim and it requires your opponent to undo 
an action that has already occurred; Type C on the other hand is a cessation of 
the opponents “hostile behavior” through a demand for demand for change in the 
composition of the adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime.167  
According to George, Type C is the most difficult because “this type of demand 
stretches coercive diplomacy to its outer limits since it may blur the distinction 
between defensive and offensive use of threats.”168 Thus, a strategy using 
coercive diplomacy calls for using sufficient force of “an appropriate kind” as to 
demonstrate one’s resolve in protecting well-defined interests, as well as, the 
credibility and determination to use more force when necessary.169  The purpose 
of an exemplary use of force in coercive diplomacy is to convey a willingness to 
do more or to persuade an adversary to stop and/or undo a course of action. The 
“offended state” must make clear whether its action is a reprisal or an exemplary 
component of coercive diplomacy.170   
As in each of the strategies presented in this thesis, coercive 
diplomacy assumes a “rational” opponent.  That is, an adversary who is 
“receptive to and will correctly evaluate information that is critical to the question 
of whether the costs and risks of not complying will outweigh the gains to be 
expected from pursuing a course of action.”171  Policymakers and leaders must 
be cognizant of personal bias and critically examine this option.  Failure to 
                                            
167 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 8. 
168 Ibid., 9. NOTE: George makes a compelling case to state that coercive diplomacy is by no means 
the only nonmilitary strategy.  He lists several other strategies such as “drawing the line”, “buying time to 
explore negotiated settlement”, “retaliation and reprisals”, as well as others in which defenders may employ 
against an opponent. See George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,  8. 
169 Ibid., 10.  
170 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 11. NOTE: George highlights the significance of 
combining threat and the employment of the threat by “appropriate communication to the opponent”. 
Furthermore, if force is used, it should not be part of a conventional military strategy for resolving a conflict 
of interest.  
171 Ibid., 13. NOTE: George identifies three key variables necessary in that specific situation for 
coercive diplomacy to be successful: (1) magnitude of the demand(s) made on the opponent; (2) the 
magnitude of the opponent’s motivation not to comply; (3) whether the opponent will feel the threatened 
punishment is sufficiently credible to and potent to cause him to comply. (pg. 14) 
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critically understand rationalize decision-making from the adversary’s perspective 
can have a significant impact on the success or failure of a coercive strategy.  As 
George explains, “The prospects for success in the choice of diplomacy are 
greatly enhanced if the policymaker can view the crisis event and his own crisis 
behavior from the perspective of the opponent.”172  Failure to recognize false 
“images” or believing in an adversary’s deception raises the likelihood of 
miscalculation and ineffective policymaking resulting to poor decisions.  
Following this logic, the key ingredient in strategy development is the accuracy of 
your information.173 
To better assist policymakers in applying the concept of coercive 
diplomacy into a strategic objective, George proposes the following: 
Converting the Abstract Model Into a Strategy
• Identify Variables of the Model
– What to demand the opponent?
– How to create a sense of urgency for 
compliance?
– What punishment is sufficiently potent 
& credible to induce compliance?
– What other positive “carrot” & “stick”
inducements will achieve desired obj?
• Identify the Preferred Variant of the 
Coercive Diplomacy Strategy
– The Classic Ultimatum
– The Tacit Ultimatum 
– Gradual Turning of the Screw
– Try and See Approach
• Replace Assumption of a “Rational”





• Take into Account Contextual 
Variables
– Examine proposed strategy in context 
to current circumstances
– Ensure a correlation of objective with 
strategy to existing situation 
Task 1
Task 3 Task 4
Task 2
 
Figure 4.   Four Tasks in Building a Strategy for Coercive Diplomacy174 
                                            
172 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 288. 
173 Ibid., 291.  
174 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 16-21. NOTE: Adapted from readings presented in 
George, Alexander (1994). “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy” 
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In Tasks 1 and 2, George sets the framework by first posing a set 
of basic questions critical to the development of a coercive strategy.  He then 
builds a set of potential responses ranging from a time-sensitive, highly 
confrontational set of approaches (Classic Ultimatum and Tacit Ultimatum) to a 
set of incremental threats that is intended to apply pressure gradually (Turning of 
the Screw and the Try and See approach).  In each case, the type of coercive 
strategy varies in degree, scope, and urgency.   
b. Practice 
The most recent example of an ultimatum delivered in response to 
a terrorist act was President Bush’s address to the Taliban regime shortly after 
the attacks on 9/11.  In 2001, President Bush dictated four demands on the 
Taliban regime: first, deliver all al Qaeda leaders; second, the release of all 
foreign nationals; third, close all terrorist training camps; and, fourth, relinquish all 
terrorists to “appropriate authorities.” The President concluded: “These demands 
are not open to negotiation or discussion.  The Taliban must act, and act 
immediately.  They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”175  
As with other examples of coercive diplomacy, success or failure is difficult to 
determine.176  The Taliban quickly rebuffed the US request and within a few days 
Mullah Omar’s delay tactics proved unacceptable and a formal response by US 
and British forces came a short time later on October 7, 2001 with air strikes.  
However, Crenshaw implies that from the beginning, the US strategy was not to 
induce bin Laden and al Qaeda to stop terrorism but to directly disrupt and 
destroy the group’s ability to conduct terrorism.177  As a result, there was limited 
room for maneuver for the Taliban and the pending conflict had become a zero- 
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sum game.  US resolve was immediate and unlike the ambiguity that surrounded 
the attacks on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration had 
made their ultimatum to the Taliban clear.178   
Based on the above, the 1998 strikes in Afghanistan failed to deter 
al Qaeda from attempting the attacks on 9/11.  While the strikes in 1998 were 
intended to serve as a decapitation strike against al Qaeda’s leadership, a 
secondary aim of deterring future aggression also clearly failed given the 
terrorists’ attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.  However, 
coercive diplomacy appeared to have had more of an impact in altering, 
influencing, and disrupting states providing sanctuary, like Sudan, that directly or 
indirectly provided assistance to Qaeda.179  Yet, in a similar scenario, coercive 
diplomacy failed to loosen al Qaeda’s influence over the Taliban.  In this case, 
coercive measures against the Taliban government in Afghanistan had little 
influence in meeting US demands to turn over those responsible for the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.   In the case of Pakistan, security concerns with India, 
the threat of internal instability, and promises of economic inducements were all 
factors that led President Musharraf to announce his support to the US in the 
search for al Qaeda.  Fear of the rise in domestic support for radical Islamists, 
placed President Musharraf in a precarious position compelling him to choose a 
path that would break the ties Pakistan had with the Taliban, prior to 9/11.180  
Coupled with pressure and inducements from the US, President Musharraf 
ultimately backed US efforts to search for those involved in the 9/11 attacks.  
 
                                            
178 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press,  2003), 119; Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy,  (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute 
Press, 2001), pgs. 110-115; and Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 191.  
NOTE: As Pillar writes the difficulty in solid and timely tactical intelligence made the response difficult.  Later, 
according Gunaratna, Saudi Security Services would point to Saudi Hezbollah, an Iranian-supported Shia 
group. 
179 Ibid., 343. NOTE: Crenshaw highlights diplomatic pressure place on Sudan that ultimately 
compelled al Qaeda to leave but its ambiguity in continued ties with the radical Islamic groups made it 
difficult to determine whether coercive diplomacy had a direct impact.  
180 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 290. 
72 
c. Assessment 
In sum, the challenge of assessing the effects of coercive 
diplomacy is difficult at best.  The focus of coercive diplomacy has and continues 
to focus on state-to-state interactions but the key in understanding its 
effectiveness is dependent upon knowing which adversaries can be coerced and 
which ones cannot.  Key to knowing the strength of your coercive strategy is to 
understand what the adversary considers valuable.  It is in this process where 
policymakers assume that adversaries possess tangible assets that their leaders 
and citizens value enough to not want to risk losing them.  Yet, the record for 
coercive diplomacy is not an encouraging one. In comparing 16 cases that took 
place from 1990 to 2001, Art analyzed the success rate of coercive diplomacy.  
The comparative breakout resulted in a 31% success rate, 50% failure rate, 6% 
ambiguous, and 12% mixed.181   
In reviewing the literature and examining the results, it becomes 
clear that policymakers will require a mix of strategies that are concise, clear, and 
consistent.  Coercive strategies will not come in a “one-size-fits-all” and must be 
tailored to meet a broad range of multiple actors, some of which may not be 
adversaries.  Beyond attempting to assess or anticipate strategic moves by the 
adversary’s leadership, an assessment of the cultural and social climate may be 
instrumental in developing effective strategies.  If extremist sentiment is born of a 
social movement, than developing an understanding of who, how, and why the 
movement exists may serve as a clue to what vulnerabilities and/or opportunities 
are present to develop potential alternative strategies.  These answers become 
essential when and if an information operations strategy is considered.  
Understanding the cause for collective action by moderates and even extremists 
who perceive joining or not joining is based on perceived benefits or payoffs.  If 
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so, what are they?  What are the incentives and what are the motivations behind 
them?  Through this analysis we may begin to assess the relative strength of a 
potential strategy that may be more effective with an appropriate mix of 
punishment and rewards or a different strategy altogether.  
2. Preemption 
Perhaps no strategy has received more attention and debate than the 
Bush administration’s shift in US policy towards preemption.  In the same 2002 
speech presented at West Point, President Bush stated that  
For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on Cold War 
doctrines of deterrence and containment.  In some cases those 
strategies still apply.  But new threats also require new thinking.  
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or 
citizens to defend.  Containment is not possible when unbalanced 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those 
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.182     
The President’s position supported by the National Security Strategy 
makes the point clear that preemptive strikes are an essential part of the 
administration’s posture to deter potential WMD attacks. It is the Bush 
administration’s belief that the risk of inaction, “even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack” poses a grave risk to the national 
security.  Further, “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, 
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” 183  However, in order for a 
preemptive strategy to be successful, the threat must be clear and unassailable.  
The accuracy and quality of intelligence is paramount in delivering the kinds of 
results desired by the President.  The relevant questions thus are: When does 
preemption become necessary? Against whom do you preempt?  What are the 
legal/political ramifications?  
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a. Theory 
In the context of counterterrorism, the theory of preemption is best 
described as a short-term strategy that is focused on thwarting an attack.  Unlike 
deterrence, preemption relies not on the threat of force, but on the use of force 
against an enemy whose attack is perceived as imminent.184  It is a strategy of 
striking first, where the initiative is taken by the intended victim and “designed to 
forestall the mobilization and deployment of the adversary’s existing military 
forces.”185  To carry out a preemptive attack requires to key theoretical 
prerequisites: the capability and intent.  “Potential target states must possess the 
ability to produce and distribute weapons and/or enabling materials to non-state 
actors.”186  In terms of thwarting a terrorist attack, preemption is also thought of 
as requiring lethal force or assassination but this is not necessarily the case.187  
In the practical examples below, a couple of cases are present to demonstrate 
how preemption was used against nation states and non-state actors.  However, 
in the case of preempting proliferation of weapons materials, US analysts must 
be certain of the threat.  Preemption is based on the belief that the aggressor has 
the means, ability, desire and intent to carry out an attack.   
b. Practice 
An example of a preemptive attack occurred in 1967 between Israel 
and the alliance formed by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan that would later be referred 
to as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (also referred to as the Six Day War).  In short, 
Israel interpreted Egypt’s moves in May of 1967 to close the Straits of Tiran and 
the massing of forces along the Sinai Peninsula as signs of an imminent attack 
against Israel.  The Egyptian maneuvers gave the Israeli forces casus belli to                                             
184 Michael Eastman and Robert Brown, “Security in the Grey Zone: Alternatives for Preventing WMD 
Handoff to Non-State Actors,” in Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment, edited by 
Russell Brown and Reid Sawyer, (Guilford,CO: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 88-102.  NOTE: Based on discussions 
and notes with Dr. Arquilla, the key term is imminent attack by an adversary.  That is, a preemptive strike is 
done in the face of an immanent attack by the adversary (1 Sep 05). 
185 Michael Eastman and Robert Brown, “Security in the Grey Zone: Alternatives for Preventing WMD 
Handoff to Non-State Actors,” 93. 
186 Ibid., 93. 
187 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 103-105. 
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move to war.  Meanwhile, conflicts arose between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan 
primarily driven by self-interest among the Arab leaders.  Sensing a pending 
strike by combined Arab forces and motivated its own self-interests, Israel 
capitalized on Egypt’s aggression by initiating preemptive air strikes against 
Egyptian Air Forces while on the ground guaranteeing the Israeli forces air 
superiority throughout the conflict.  In the east, Jordan had initiated attacks in the 
city of Jerusalem but the disorganized Arab forces were quickly neutralized from 
causing further aggression by the Israeli forces.  Within a few hours Israel 
managed to overwhelm remaining Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi air forces.  The 
speed, ferocity, and effective planning by the Israeli Defense Force ensured a 
quick and complete victory within a matter of days.  Considered by one historian, 
Avi Shlaim, “the most spectacular military victory in Israel’s history,”188  The 
preemptive strike ensured that the Israeli forces gained the upper hand in 
preventing a possible invasion by Egypt and its Arab allies.  In this case, Israeli 
intelligence and intentions were clear, planned, deliberate, and well thought out.   
A more tactical example of preemptive a terrorist attack occurred in 
Amman, Jordan on 20 April 2004 where Jordanian authorities arrested 6 
individuals and killed 4 in a raid to pre-empt a suicide truck bomb attack.  A cell 
comprised of local nationals with alleged ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, also a 
Jordanian national, planned and coordinated a strike that was within a few days 
of following through with the pre-planned strikes.  The cell’s plan was to use 
several specially modified heavy duty trucks capable of penetrating perimeter 
walls and gates. These trucks were filled with 20 tons of industrial chemicals and 
explosives to crash through the entry gates and check point surrounding the 
Jordanian intelligence agency headquarters, located in country’s capital of 
Amman, destroying the headquarters buildings and contaminating the area.  The 
estimated number of casualties would have been anywhere from as low as 
20,000 up to 80,000 lives and impacting an area approximately a half-a-mile in 
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diameter.  The original plan had also called for strikes against the US embassy 
and the Prime Minister’s office. 189   
c. Assessment 
In sum, the significant factor in each of the two cases above was 
intelligence.  In the first case substantial force was used but in a deliberate and 
focused way.  Likewise in the tactical example force was applied to neutralize 
four suspects but the element of speed, surprise, and intelligence were essential 
for thwarting the threat despite having the means, ability, and intent of carrying 
out these plans. As reflected in both The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(Authorized Edition), and The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction gaps in our intelligence 
system are wide enough to make the U.S. ability to assign blame and retaliate 
difficult.  “The bad news is that we still know disturbingly little about the weapons 
programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous 
adversaries.”190  Still, in dealing with terrorism, preemption has a place for “just-
in-time” disruption but the gamble and cost may be great and the payoff 
dependent on multiple factors namely perfect timing and actionable intelligence.   
Another factor to consider is that “preemption is narrowly bounded 
to address only the physical transfers of weapons, technology, and expertise 
from states to non-state actors.”191  As Professor Gunaratna explained, states 
tend to spend a great deal of time and effort in smallest segment in the spectrum 
of conflict and operations driving to resources to support preemptive strategies 
as opposed to the broader spectrum where other strategies may prove more 
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effective.192  For example, dealing with a problem before it becomes a crisis 
prevents adversaries for obtaining the means.  In dealing with nuclear terrorism, 
if preemption is our last resort, we may be too late.  For instance, not until the 
success of coercive diplomacy activities against Libya to renounce its support for 
terrorism and WMD did US and the United Nations officials discover the extent to 
which Libya had developed its weapons program.  One Bush administration 
official stated that their “work was much further advanced” than expected.193  The 
example reveals that in closing a dialogue with the adversary and in light of 
limited resources officials are limited in the knowledge of the effectiveness in 
their policies.  With limited intelligence or knowledge, preemptive strikes have the 
potential is setting off a chain of events leading to unforeseen circumstances.  As 
a result, preemption should be limited and finite if used at all.   
3. Prevention 
Unlike preemption, a preventive strategy seeks to remove or eliminate the 
chance of an adversary from acquiring a capability.  For example, in the case of 
weapons proliferation, a preventive strategy seeks to remove the chance that a 
potential hostile state may transfer WMD through counterproliferation measures 
and thwarting terrorist from acquiring the means to create WMD weapons.  From 
a strategic perspective, states have launched preventive strikes in an effort “to 
block or retard the rise of a challenger while that opportunity is still available.”194  
Lawrence Freedman distinguishes the two by describing prevention as strategy 
that is “cold blooded: it intends to deal with a problem before it becomes a crisis, 
while preemption is a more desperate strategy employed in the heat of crisis.”  Of 
the four strategies prevention appears to be the broadest in meaning and 
interpretation.  For example, others would include dealing with the study and 
understanding of the causes that lead to political violence as an element of a 
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preventive strategy.195  However, for the purposes of this essay we shall focus 
on the two general forms of preventive strategy passive and active. 
a. Theory 
The basic idea of prevention can be described as a concept that 
“provides a means of confronting factors that are likely to contribute to the 
development of a threat before it has had a chance to become imminent.”196  
Thus states would also consider preventive strategies that are passive as those 
actions taken to mitigate the availability of a potential adversary from gaining 
access to or the means for terrorist attacks.  This passive defensive approach 
may include shoring up defenses in such a way to make it difficult for a terrorist 
to acquire or steal sensitive materials.  The objective is to reduce vulnerabilities.  
Another aspect of passive defense is to increase fortifications and physical 
barriers in such way that someone attempting to bring in a destructive capacity is 
thwarted by the defenses that are in place.  An example of this is are road 
blocks, gates, and check in points.  Essentially, a passive preventive strategy is 
one that protects sensitive materials from getting out or denying harmful material 
(or attacks) from getting in.  In passive preventive strategy, the protector controls 
the ways and means where an attack may occur. 
In contrast, preventive strategies that are active require “the 
employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested 
area or position to the enemy.”197  For example, interdiction or striking an 
adversary before he gains access or the means of WMD is an example of an 
active preventive strategy.  This concept is focused on physically halting the 
proliferation of WMD by a supplier or rogue state.  According to the 2002  
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction active and passive 
defense are considered part of the US government’s counterproliferation 
strategy.   
                                            
195 Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire, 99-102.  NOTE: More on this idea under the 
assessment portion of Preventive Strategy. 
196 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 85. 
197 Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, pg. GL-2 
79 
b. Practice 
In practice the US government applies its preventive strategy 
primarily in three ways: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 
management.198  In the area of non-proliferation, the US engaged in diplomatic 
efforts to mitigate the proliferation of nuclear technologies and other sensitive 
materials through multilateral regimes, arms control practices, and other state-to-
state agreements.  The effort is focused on ensuring multinational cooperation in 
controlling and managing sensitive materials, import/export controls, and 
sanctions against states who fail to comply.199   
The active enforcement of these policies deals more in the realm of 
counterproliferation.  Specifically, events that are related to acts of interdiction 
and deterrence are considered part of counterproliferation.  An example of such 
programs include the Container Security Initiative (CSI) where states agree to 
allow for the inspection of US-bound containers to be inspected in their home 
port of origin prior to placing the container on ships.200  Also, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) is an agreement with 60 nations that allows for the 
interdiction of sea or air shipments with the specific intent to inspect for WMD or 
WMD-related materials to or by states that are labeled as a “proliferation 
concern.”201  In addition, through programs like the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) the US engages with other 
states to reduce access or remove nuclear and radiological materials and 
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weapons.202  Where nonproliferation and counterproliferation concentrate on 
actions prior to an event, consequence management (CM) focuses on the 
recovery after an attack.  CM is concerned with minimizing the consequences of 
a WMD attack against the US population and responding to the recovery of 
military forces, civilians and allies.203   
The best example of an offensive preventive attack was the Israeli 
strike of the Iraqi nuclear plant in Osirak near Baghdad in 1981.  Growing 
concerns of further isolation and the fear over the coercive potential of an Arab 
state owning a nuclear weapon drove Israel to seek an end to Iraq’s development 
effort.  In an address to the Israeli people Prime Minister Menachem Begin stated 
that "On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass 
destruction against the people of Israel."204  Israel did not anticipate the response 
received by the Arab world and the United States but justified Operation Babylon 
in the interest of Israeli survival and national security.   
c. Assessment 
Preventive strategy is perhaps the most critical first step in 
mitigating or preventing a threat from potential threats of “superterrorism.”  In 
concept it is most critical because it was within the best interest to protect those 
specific areas considered most important or vital to core interests.  As a 
consequence, the intelligence required for a preventive strategy is high but 
slightly less than what is required for a successful preemptive strategy.  In setting 
the agenda to minimize the terrorist threat the first step is to isolate and minimize 
vulnerabilities.  Additionally, returning to the idea proposed previously on 
addressing the root causes for extremism as part of a preventive strategy is also 
of interest.  The ultimate preventive strategy, if it is to be truly preventive, must at 
least consider the domestic and transnational threat posed by weapons of mass 
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destruction.  In essence, a WMD can potentially be a threat that may cross 
boundaries and interests across a global spectrum.  This strategy may prove 
effective in developing a “honey pot” type of scenario where stings may be 
effective in drawing out components of network bent on acquiring, supplying, and 
buying nuclear of radiological materials.  The goal may shift to target the supply 
network, procurement network, or terrorist network.  While it is possible that one 
network could theoretically function in all three environments, it is highly unlikely.  
In the case of al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo, both organizations attempted to 
procure weapons-grade material and failed.  Assuming that the target of such a 
plan is the supply network, friendly forces could assume the role of procurement 
or terrorist network and draw out the network who may be willing to supply such 
materials.   
In sum, this section reviewed the key aspects of current US 
strategies as it relates to prevention.  Key aspects of an effective preventive 
strategy include passive and active preventive efforts as well as multilateral 
efforts focused on stemming the proliferation of highly sensitive material.  In a 
recent briefing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Laura 
Holgate stated that the key difference “between a terrorist and a nuclear terrorist 
is found in the word ‘nuclear’: no nuclear material, no nuclear terrorism.”205  In 
effect, the intelligence requirement to prevent proliferation of sensitive material is 
not limited to just radiological and nuclear matter or even dual-use technology, 
but also includes close monitoring and tracking of facilities that are unguarded or 
with weak security.  Finally, and perhaps the most challenging is tracking the 
proliferation of technical skill and knowledge.  An effective prevention strategy 
would also have to include policies to deter the proliferation of the knowledge and 
know-how in putting such a capability together.   
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Throughout the Cold War, the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD) served as the principle deterrent strategy between the United States and 
the Soviet Union where the threat of a retaliatory strike by one over the other 
ensured the annihilation of both.206  The basic concept was one where the cost 
and benefit for both was well known and understood by both.  In their book 
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Alexander George 
and Richard Smoke break down a conceptual model of deterrence and cost-
benefit analysis. As described, deterrence works when the adversary, determines 
that its projected cost plus the risks of a potential action outweigh any real benefit 




Table 7.   Basic Deterrence Theory208 
 
However, as Thomas Schelling points out, deterrence will only be effective 
if the threat is (1) credible and (2) rational.209  In short, to be effective, deterrent 
strategies are dependent on the credibility as determined from the perspective 
target, be it non-state actors, proliferators, or states.  At a minimum, the initiator 
must appear to have both the capability and the intent to inflict the threatened 
punishment.  In response, the adversary must conclude that the risks of taking 
action against the intended target or victim outweigh the benefits.   
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a. Theory 
In applying this theoretical approach to the terrorist threat of WMD, 
one of the first questions asked is who to deter? And, can terrorists be deterred?  
If we’re to apply the deterrence against a proliferation network, we may run into 
the same challenges as with the preemption strategy.  Much like preemption, 
there is no reason to assume deterrence is “an effective way to approach the 
specific threat of WMD proliferation without first examining the strategy’s 
theoretical and operational requirements.”210  To rely on a deterrent strategy for 
the handoff of nuclear and radiological materials is a straightforward policy where 
the US promises the destruction of a regime for any state that transfers WMD to 
non-state actors.  According to Eastman and Brown, a deterrent strategy has a 
reasonable chance of success if both of the following conditions are met: 
1) The US must have the ability to monitor WMD transactions 
and demonstrate to potential adversaries that any attempt to 
sell or hand off WMD will not go undetected.  If a 
proliferating state thinks it will not get caught, then concerns 
about potential punishment can be brushed off. 
2) Efforts should be taken to make the threatened response 
credible.  Proliferators must believe that there is a 
reasonable chance that the United States has both the 
capability and the will to impose the promised penalties.211   
Once again, we see the challenge as being both possessing and 
communicating the capability and intent to strike back if struck, and that the 
cost/risks outweigh the perceived benefit. In the following section, we shall briefly 
examine how deterrence theory has been applied in context to previous attacks.  
b. Practice 
In considering US response to terrorist attacks prior to September 
11, 2001, one can argue as Jenkins and Davis do, that “al Qaeda leaders saw 
the United States as something that could be driven out” of Saudi Arabia and the 
Middle East and believed the US to be vulnerable.  The strength of an effective 
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211 Ibid., 92 
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deterrence strategy is predicated on a state’s response to a terrorist attack.  A 
weak response has the potential of undermining deterrence of future terrorist 
attacks.  Through a series of specific attacks, the US had lost credibility in 
forcefully responding to the terrorist bombings.   
 
Response to Islamist Terrorist Attacks Prior to September 11 
 Year  Attack Overt U.S. Military Response 
1983 Beirut Withdrawal 
1984-86 American Hostages in Lebanon U.S. concessions to buy freedom of hostages 
1993 Mogadishu Withdrawal 
1998 Al-Khobar Towers None 
1998 Kenya/Tanzania Cruise Missile Attack 
2000 USS Cole None 
Table 8.    US Response to Terrorist Attacks212 
 
Drawing from the list above, the bombing of the Marine barracks in 
1983 had an immediate impact resulting in President Reagan’s decision to pull 
remaining troops off shore and out of Beirut.  Echoes of the US experience in 
Beirut repeated itself ten years later in 1993 when US members participated as 
part of the United Nations led operations called UNISOM I and later UNISOM II.  
With the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, the focus turned to 
the capture of the warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid.  Ultimately, the event 
culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu in October of 1993 where US forces lost 
18 servicemen.  The number of Somalis killed is estimated between 350 to 1,000 
gunmen and civilians.  In the end, like Beirut, US forces withdrew from 
Somalia.213  In the case of Khobar Towers and the USS Cole, no response was 
                                            
212 Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the 
War on al Qaeda, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 27. 
213 BBC News, “US Forces Killed in Somali Gun Battle,” BBC News, October 4, 2003, 
http://newssearch.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/4/newsid_2486000/2486909.stm, (June 4, 
2005). 
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perceived as a response in itself.  The lack of response appeared to have 
emboldened extremist confidence.  
In their analysis, Davis and Jenkins emphasize the need to show 
strength consistently and not just at one point and time.  “Rather, deterrence (and 
other forms of influence) will be enhanced if the United States conveys clearly 
that its determination is for the long run, with no respite, no forgetting, and no 
quarter.”  Like the preemptive argument, much of the effort is spent in 
anticipation of a response by terrorist network.  The use of deterrence alone is 
insufficient in thwarting a nuclear terrorist attack if the opportunity presented 
itself.  
c. Assessment 
As some experts agree, deterrence, in theory may hold some 
value.  As in the previous section under prevention, a sting operation targeting 
supply, procurement, or terrorist networks may be effective from operational point 
of view with the potential to impact a terrorists’ decision-making for potential 
alternatives.  However, as Davis and Jenkins points out, the track record is less 
than conducive in allowing deterrence to stand on its own.  There’s room to 
reassess how to view deterrence as it applies to extremists or terrorist groups.  
One key aspect is to look carefully of what terrorist value or hold dear.  As the 
Davis and Jenkins argue, “Finding levers is the easy part.  Causing ostensibly 
friendly heads of state to use them, and do so reasonably, is hard.”214  In the 
following chart, the authors provide a list of some potential options to influence 
terrorists. 
 
                                            
214 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, 48 
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Threatening What the Terrorists and Their Supporters Hold Dear 
Participants in Terrorism 




- Family Tribe, tribe, 
brotherhood  
 
Turn leaders against each other (by disinformation, deception). 
Convince them that attacking the US undermines their cause; raise operational risks. 
Cause state leaders to prevent rewards to families of terrorists and even to punish 
them by withholding privileges; cause state leaders to harass terrorist leaders and 
punish them economically. 
Foot soldiers 
- Cause; excitement 
 
- Family, tribe, 
brotherhood 
 
Raise operational risks; with continuing U.S. successes, both micro and macro, 





- Wealth, power, life 
- Family, tribe, 
brotherhood 
 
Discredit their cause within Islam and society. 
Cause loss of wealth, prison, death, and dishonor. V                                                     
a 
See above. 
Logisticians Cause prison, death, and dishonor. 
State Supporters 
- Power                             
c     
- Own Political Goals 
 
 
Selected strikes and incursions (preemption); impose military, political, and 
economic sanctions; shun supporters of terrorism. 
Convince them that attacks on the United States undermine their cause; provide 
other ways to seek goals. 
Populations 
- Survival 




Provide hope (peace process, aid, liberalization, etc.). 
Broaden the range of ideas and views discussed. 
Remind them “who rides the bigger horse” (cite U.S. successes against al Qaeda, 
local suppression).             
Religious Leaders 
- Power, status 
- Personal and Family 
welfare 
 
Trump (discredit them), warn them off, monitor them shut off funds. 
Cause prison, death, and dishonor, and prevent benefits to families. 
Figure 5.   Targets of Influence215 
 
                                            
215 Graph adapted from Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, 48. 
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On the one hand Davis and Jenkins open the door to other 
alternative views of how and who to target operationally by broadening its 
strategy.  They argue that the “strategy of deterrence is the wrong concept—it is 
both too limiting and too naive. It is far better to conceive a strategy with an 
influence component, which has both a broader range of coercive elements and 
a range of plausible positives, some of which we know from history are essential 
for long-term success.”216  Further, by broadening the target set friendly forces 
may gain more leverage in understanding the core issues driving implicit or tacit 
support for political violence by extremist groups.   
Taking Davis and Jenkins’ ideas further, Daniel Whiteneck 
recommends redefining the meaning by suggesting the following: 
Rather than abandoning deterrence, it can be redefined as 
providing influence against moral, spiritual, educational, recruiting, 
and financial support of WMD terrorism by one of two sets of 
actors, either by states or nongovernmental, transnational, societal 
elements also referred to as the “Al Qaeda system,” consisting of 
religious figures and institutions, political leaders and movements, 
financiers, less ambitious or less global terrorist groups and 
guerrillas, and other entities that provide either direct or indirect 
assistance to Al Qaeda’s operations.217 
Once again, similar to the idea suggested previously for expanding 
the meaning of prevention, we see a call for a redefinition of the meaning for 
deterrence, as a push to exert influence and persuade rather than to rely on 
measures that coerce and intimidate.  In so doing, we also open the door to the 
ultimate deterrent and preventive strategy, the root causes of political violence.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
According to Daniel Byman and Mathew Waxman, authors of Dynamics of 
Coercion, there are four sets of key challenges that will confront policy makers in 
the future: “(1) constraints on the use of force emanating from domestic politics; 
(2) constraints imposed by coalition partners; (3) difficulties associated with 
                                            
216 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, 61. 
217 Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on Framework,” The Washington Quarterly, vol 
28, no. 3, (Summer 2005), 188. 
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humanitarian intervention; and (4) dangers involved in confronting adversaries 
armed with weapons of mass destruction.”218  The authors postulate that public 
support will continue to drive decision makers to seek low-cost, low-impact 
alternatives to the use of force or coercion.  Despite the attacks on 9/11, actions 
since the war in Afghanistan, namely operations in Iraq, continue to impact US 
influence in the Arab world and the Middle East.  Extremism is not exclusive to 
Jihadist and Islamists in the Middle East, but exists throughout the world and the 
United States who see political violence as the only means to achieve desired 
results.  Yet as the availability of new technology becomes more prolific and 
extremism ideology continues to rise, strategies that are preventive in nature 
should take precedence.  As stated previously without nuclear material, there can 
be no nuclear terrorism, but what about the remaining options?  Below is a table 
with a comparative look of each strategy as they apply to the post-9/11 era:  
                                            
218 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 
Limits of Military Might, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19-20. 
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Coping with the Threat of Nuclear and Radiological Terror 
 Operational Complexity In telligence Req’ts Public Opinion 
Coercive Diplomacy Credibility needed is 
substantial. 
Must have significant 
amount of intell to be 
credible coupled with 
ability to carry out 
options. Need strong 
cultural awareness. 
Generally accepted but 
overall record is poor 
when dealing between 
states.  Requires policy 
shift to deal with non-
state actors.  
Preemption Extensive Intel Req’ts Highest of all options Somewhat accepted but 
impact of Gulf War II 
raises concern.  While 
viewed as  preemptive, 
IQ was more preventive 
Prevention Substantial but slightly 
less than Preemption in 
term of Intel reqts, but 
critical to success. 
Significant: Results to 
drive cost to prevent  
Resistant due to lack of 
success in discovering 
WMD in IQ. Focus on 
defending CONUS more 
accepted. 
Deterrence Retaliation Low: Dependent of 
fidelity of forensics to 
ID those responsible 
Acceptable: To retaliate 
for a 9/11 attack is more 
palatable than other 
options.  Reactionary in 
nature. 
Table 9.   Assessment Criteria of Individual Strategies219 
 
1. Prevention First:  As expressed in the idea that by removing nuclear 
materials from the equation you eliminate nuclear terrorism.  However, this 
activity is one that cannot be performed unilaterally.  Cooperation and a 
multilateral effort are critical to preventing a “superterrorist” event. 
2. Mixed strategies: No one strategy can be effective on its own.  As we 
have seen, effective deterrent and coercive efforts are dependent on multiple  
 
                                            
219 Author’s notes adapted from lecture presented by Dr. John Arquilla in SO 3101 Conflict in the 
Information Age, November 3, 2004, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
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factors such as terrorist will and intent; access to nuclear material and supplies; 
effectiveness of preventive measures to get to and from a target; and the 
vulnerability of the target itself.   
3. Credibility: Effective preemptive and deterrent strategies are difficult 
without credibility.  As presented in Tables 2 & 3, credibility is a common theme 
in the adversary’s assessment of their success.  The less credible the nation 
appears, the greater the adversary’s hope for success.  As witnessed by several 
polls and as reflected in a 2004 RAND study220, US opinion in the minds of many 
in the Arab world has dropped in standing.  As result, perhaps a strategy of less 
is more may help to reduce negative credibility.  Allowing more of a “hands-off” 
approach in Middle Eastern affairs may allow for states to establish themselves 
would give states a sense of self-determination while removing the spot light off 
of US policy and involvement.  If necessary, the concept of “by, with, and 
through” friendly states should be considered the norm and not the alternative.  
This may be one way to balance pressing needs while supporting friendly states.  
4.  Intelligence:  The limits of intelligence have never been more 
pronounced than in the decision to go to war with Iraq.  Without eyes on the 
ground the difficulty in validating whether or not weapons of mass destruction 
exists, the task is verifying is daunting.  The Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
identified there was, potentially, a rush to war.  Rather than focusing on the 
shortcomings of the intelligence community and debating whether the U.S. 
administration knew what and when, the attention should be placed on how best 
to improve “what we know” and how best to fuse them into our strategic planning.  
In addition, improving the forensic capability to target, track, and identify material 
of origin may also complement deterrent strategies when dealing with states who 
may wittingly or unwittingly provide weapons-grade or radiological material.  
                                            
220 Brian Rosen and Charles Wolf, Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It, (Santa 
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5.  Redefine targets of influence:  In regards to strategies listed a call for 
redefining the meaning of each was identified.  Specifically, shifting from 
deterrence to influence or expanding the definition of prevention to strive for the 
long term goal of resolving the roots of violent extremism reflects a need for 
greater understanding of the social, political, economic, religious and other 
factors affecting strategy development.  
  6.  Focus on Social Movements:  To date US policies have focused on two 
approaches: (1) dealing with state-to-state actors or (2) attempting to stop or 
thwart individual terrorist or terrorist groups.221  In reference to earlier 
discussions presented in Chapter I, the focus of engaging in the early stages of a 
social movement may serve well as a means to develop preemptive strategies, 
potentially mitigating or isolating the more radical or extreme elements of a 
movement.  Such an approach will require states like the U.S. to work with 
regional allies and in-country personnel to work by, with, and through and 
develop greater and deeper social and cultural awareness.  By gaining a deeper 
understanding of the pertinent issues that relate to social movements states can 
better address key questions such as:  Who are the key players? What are the 
movement’s primary concerns?  Who are the leaders?  Is there a formal or 
informal social network?  Is their a violent element within the movement? Is so 
why and what can be done about it?  In studying social movements, we are 
actually analyzing the various processes that may be implicitly or explicitly 
“connected” or interconnected within a movement.  A social movement in and of 
itself may be too big and diffused to analyze in its entirety.  However, to the 
extent that one begins to see the interconnections of a social movement, 
opportunities to develop solutions and resolve disputes or diffuse extreme 
rhetoric can begin. 
 
 
                                            
221 NOTE:  Within academia, much attention has been placed in attempting to interpret the motivation 
or the mindset of a terrorist. 
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D. SUMMARY 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of mass-
destruction has raised security concerns to an unprecedented degree not seen 
since the end of the Cold War.  In response to terrorism, policy-makers have 
focused the preponderance of US strategy to influence state actors in an effort to 
constrain or control the use of political violence by extremists.  However, 
directing policies towards states may be ineffective and should instead consider 
policies that affect the broader social movements that transcend across state 
boundaries.  Thus, US strategies must be crafted to affect states who instigate or 
assist transnational terrorism as well as social movements who are influenced by 
or support violent extremism.  Thus the research question posed is which 
strategy or combination of strategies between coercive diplomacy, pre-emption, 
prevention, and deterrence, would be most effective in countering the threat of 
extreme violence, specifically the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism?   
In essence, prevention remains the first and foremost strategy to deter 
terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radiological materials.  However, a 
combination of mixed-strategies such as deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and 
preemption can have an impact but in very specific situations.  The short-fall will 
continue to be intelligence but way to analyze such likelihood for violence is to 
under the causes that spawn violent social movement from within the broader 
social movement.  Such a methodology would enable a better opportunity to 










V. WINNING THE RACE AGAINST NUCLEAR TERROR 
A. OVERVIEW 
In 2002, President George W. Bush stated that "The gravest danger to 
freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology…. when 
that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power 
to strike great nations."222  Such a scenario would not only threaten the security 
of the United States, but send shock waves through the notion of the 
Westphalian construct of nation-states as primary actors within the international 
system.  The community of nations would be compelled to confront the coercive 
power posed by non-state actors armed with nuclear and radiological weapons or 
acquiesce to non-state actor demands.  To date, the U.S. has concentrated its 
strategic efforts on preventing states with potential links to terrorist organizations 
from acquiring a nuclear capability and limiting the threat of loose nukes by 
pursuing policies of non-proliferation.  In fact, the author argues that states with 
the potential to proliferate nuclear weapons to non-state actors must remain a 
central component of US policy and strategic efforts.  However, expanding the 
dialogue and critical thought to in applying flexible options targeted at sub-state 
level should also be considered.  The question then is one of defining the targets 
of influence and how would strategies apply to sub-state actors? 
Sub-state actors or transnational criminal networks with ability to access, 
acquire, and supply a terrorist network with nuclear material poses a different 
challenge all together.  Such a scenario may reflect security concerns that are 
customarily associated with weak states or states with poor security measures in 
which terrorists operate and exploit permissive environments.  As demonstrated 
by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, weak or failed states are not the only ones who may 
be exploited.  Relatively stable or strong states can fall victim too.  As a result, 
one may argue that the intersection of supply, proliferation, and terrorist networks 
                                            
222 US Department of State, “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda”, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. 
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could constitute a nexus of nuclear terror.  In essence, the race against nuclear 
terror is a race against merging networks with access and the means to acquire 
such destructive technology.   
B. A MULTI-ANALYTICAL APPROACH ~ THE NEXUS OF NUCLEAR 
TERROR 
In analyzing today’s strategic approaches, current policies are focused on 
the supply side of the problem, with increased emphasis in counterproliferation 
and counterterrorism efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.  As presented through 
the case studies in Chapter III, a broader approach is needed to continue the 
pressure on potential networks to include supply, proliferation, and terrorist 
groups.  Our first step is to view the interconnected nature of key processes that 
may occur in arming non-state actors with nuclear or radiological weapons. 








Figure 6.   The Nexus of Nuclear Terror223 
 
The three networks depicted by the single-dimensional model above 
represent key functions that are of concern to decision-makers in developing 
strategies to mitigate or prevent nuclear terror.  For the supply network, the focus 
is on those group(s) directly involved in acquiring nuclear weapons or radiological 
materials to include highly enriched uranium or plutonium.    In the context of this 
                                            
223 Author’s concept derived to explain the inter-connectivity between multiple functions and networks. 
NOTE:  The solid lines depict established contacts whereas dashed lines represent suspected contacts.   
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study, a supply network includes individuals/groups with direct access to nuclear 
and radiological material and charged with the responsibility to maintain or 
secure such technologies.  At the most basic level, a proliferation network is 
concerned with individuals, groups, or criminal networks whose interests are in 
connecting suppliers with customers, in this case, terrorist groups with nuclear 
weapons.   Following this train of thought, states who wish to directly provide 
weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups would also serve a similar 
function as combined supplier/proliferation network reflected in the figure below. 







Figure 7.   Collapsed Networks: Proliferation and Supply Networks224 
 
In the previous chapter, both Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda attempted to 
acquire nuclear materials directly from sub-state actors from the former Soviet 
republics.  Ultimately their attempts failed and both groups sought to develop an 
easier, less deadly alternative on their own, chemical and biological weapons.    
This case presents an example of the merger of two or more key functions within 
a group or network.  The merger of two or more networks presents a deepening 
problem as characterized by today’s concerns about a nuclear capable North 
Korea with the potential to proliferate nuclear materials to non-state actors.225 
Finally the last scenario and area of primary concern is the fusing of all 
three functions into one network.  That is, a terrorist network in the possession of 
                                            
224 Author’s concept derived to explain the inter-connectivity between multiple functions and networks. 
225 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program, 2005,” (May/June 2004), 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=mj05norris, 64-67.  
96 
a nuclear weapon or radiological materials sufficient to create a bomb.  Efforts to 
mitigate this dire problem involve constraining the degree of cooperation and 
permissiveness involved within each of these networks, either through internal or 
external controls; or through broader transnational regimes intended to control 
the degree of exchange between the various networks with terrorist groups.   
By turning the model illustrated in Figure 6 on its side, we attempt to 
analyze the depth of coordination and exchange between primary networks.  By 
placing the model on a multi-dimensional spectrum, we add an additional level of 
analysis to understand the Level of Coordination both within and between 
networks.  As opposed to traditional coordination such as state-to-state 
interactions, other potential scenarios include: state-to-non-state actor, insider-to-
network, or network-to-network coordination.  The Level of Permissiveness 
depicted assesses how much each network is allowed to operate within and 
outside its environment.  That is, an evaluation of how much control or authority 
is exerted by the state that enables or constricts networks the space in which to 
operate.  For example, in the case of Aum, the cult successfully exploited 
Japan’s religious tolerance and extensive laws protecting religious groups.226  
Likewise, al Qaeda’s influence over the Taliban in Afghanistan enabled the group 
to pursue efforts to obtain nuclear and radiological materials though failing in the 
end.  Yet, both succeeded in pursuing an easier alternative of developing, testing 
and, in the case of Aum, employing chemical and biological weapons.   However,  
in terms of proliferation, both actors failed in convincing proliferation networks in 
providing the essential materiel central to this thesis, nuclear and weapons-
useable radiological material. 
                                            
226 Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinchasa 
Reactor,” 3.  
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Figure 8.   Interactions across Multiple Networks227 
 
The figure above explores a multi-dimensional way to analyze and assess 
the “connectiveness” between key functions and networks.  The lines connecting 
the different networks reflect the degree of coordination and cooperation between 
different functions.  In the case of al Qaeda and Aum, both groups attempted to 
leverage their contacts to acquire nuclear and radiological material to develop a 
nuclear capability.  In comparing both groups, Aum, with its contacts and in-
house scientists, appeared to have had the better opportunity to purchase such 
material.  The role of “proliferators” was less pronounced for Aum since it 
attempted to use its wealth and contacts to acquire nuclear materials by bribing 
officials.  By way of Russia’s criminal element, al Qaeda had believed that they 
were in fact dealing with proliferators or, at minimum, individuals who could 
acquire such materials.  In fact, according to Rohan Gunaratna, “intelligence 
sources now believe that criminal elements sold al Qaeda irradiated canisters 
                                            
227 Author’s concept derived to explain the inter-connectivity between multiple functions and networks. 
98 
purporting to contain materials stolen from Russian army bases, whereas in fact 
the contents would have had no military value whatsoever had it been passed on 
to rogue scientists.”228  Applying the models to the case of al Qaeda we see the 
following:   








Figure 9.   Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Ambitions229 
























Figure 10.   Al Qaeda’s Coordination Links230 
                                            
228 Rohan Gunaratna, “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror,” 15.  
229 Author’s model used to explain al Qaeda’s interaction with supply and proliferation networks.  
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Al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire nuclear materials was based on dealing with 
individuals who were nothing more than a criminal element that essentially 
“ripped off” bin Laden and al Qaeda’s point man, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, in 
buying what was red mercury and not radioactive materials.231  As a result, the 
graph shows a proliferation network that is closer in cooperation with a supply 
network but less willing to coordinate with suppliers in providing a terrorist group 
with a nuclear bomb.  From al Qaeda’s perspective, the link between its 
organization and the proliferation group appears stronger than it really is.  In part, 
al Qaeda had believed the proliferation network was willing to provide bin 
Laden’s organization with nuclear materials.  Unfortunately for al Qaeda, the 
proliferation network was not as cooperative as the group was led to believe.  In 
the end, the proliferators had no intention of providing a weapon to the group.  In 
essence, al Qaeda fell victim to a scam.   
Applied to Aum, the author contends that the multi-dimensional diagram 
would be similar to that of al Qaeda with the exception of the linkage shown 
between the Aum and potential proliferators.  Rather that a solid line between 
both networks, the author would use a thin or dashed line to reflect the tenuous 
connection between both networks.  In the end, Aum also failed to convince 
proliferators to provide the group with a nuclear weapon or radiological material.  
One take-away is that terrorist groups are susceptible to stings and have the 
potential of being deceived.  Follow-on research should concentrate on 
developing a deeper analysis of other potential opportunities and vulnerabilities 
to exploit and interdict these networks to include finances and communications.  
Such options should not be limited solely to terrorist networks but expanded to 
supply and proliferation networks as well.  An indirect approach through 
proliferation and supply networks may yield critical data in mapping terrorist 
activities.  
                                            
230 Author’s concept derived to explain al Qaeda’s coordination and interaction between multiple 
proliferation and supply networks. 
231 Stefan Leader, “Osama bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD,” (June 1998), Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, vol. 11, no.6, 34-37. 
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C. TOWARD A “NEW” STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter presented a comprehensive view of traditional 
strategies.  Here, the focus is to build on the definitions presented in Chapter IV 
and present a notional discussion of how these strategies would apply against 
non-state actors.  While these concepts are not “new” per se, the effort here is 
intended to examine the possibility of redefining these known strategies in the 
context of affecting proliferation, supply, and terrorist networks.  It is important to 
understand that each network is motivated for different reasons.  For example, al 
Qaeda’s instrumental reasons differ greatly from the for-profit intentions of a 
supply or proliferation network.  The motivations and causes for why various 
networks operate vary widely and beyond the scope of this study.  However, the 
knowledge and understanding of how and why these networks operate are a 
critical component to the intelligence necessary in shaping effective strategies.  
With this in mind the following matrix is presented in order to identify a potential 
target audience for each strategy within each network followed by a brief 




Comparative Strategies Applied to Mitigate the Threat of Nuclear Terror 
 Proliferation Network Supply Network Terrorist Network 
Coercive 
Diplomacy 
Target Audience: States, leaders 
of transnational criminal networks 
Assessment:  Effective against 
states with potential application to 
network leaders assuming 
sufficient intelligence.  
Strategic Applicability: Possible 
Target Audience: States, Gov’t 
Officials, Scientists, Security 
Personnel, & Military 
Assessment: Most effective against 
states. Requires multinational 
efforts; Must know actor’s specific 
interests, concerns, & weakness 
Strategic Applicability: Possible 
Target Audience: Terror group 
leaders, religious leaders, & 
operational planners. 
Assessment: Assuming that 
terrorist cannot be deterred, 
strategy against terrorist networks 
will likely prove ineffective. 
Strategic Applicability: Unlikely 
Preemption Target Audience: States and 
criminal networks 
Assessment: Intel intensive and 
more difficult to determine below 
the state level. Aimed at specific 
individuals and middle-men.  
Strategic Applicability: Unlikely 
Target Audience: Scientists and 
Security Personnel at research 
centers, nuclear storage areas. 
Assessment: Intense intel req’d but 
best group to interdict before 
weapon reaches terrorists. 
Strategic Applicability: Possible 
Target Audience: Terrorist network 
Assessment: Most difficult.  
Assumes specific tactical intel of 
weapon group location. Must know 
where/if other weapons are pre-
positioned 
Strategic Applicability: Last resort 
Prevention Target Audience: Transnational 
criminal networks/corrupt officials   
Assessment: Preventing network 
from proliferating requires 
interdicting comms links between 
criminal network & suppliers. 
Susceptible to “honey pots” posing 
as potential buyers. 
Strategic Applicability: High 
Target Audience: Gov’t officials, 
scientists, and security officials 
protecting technology 
Assessment: Multinational effort 
needed to interdict; focus on 
preventing internal threat from 
providing access to or knowledge of 
materials. Emphasis in security. 
Strategic Applicability: High 
Target Audience: Terrorist 
Operatives  
Assessment: Domestic protection 
is the primary focus. Domestic 
ports, enhanced detection and 
forensic measures.  Tracking of 
potential networks and individuals. 
Strategic Applicability: High  
Deterrence Target Audience: States, Criminal 
bosses and corrupt officials 
Assessment: Must tailor to group, 
state actor or player.  Requires 
highly active law enforcement and 
intelligence resources.  Deception 
practice to discover extent of 
network would be effective. 
Strategic Applicability: Possible 
Target Audience: Officials, 
scientists, security officials 
Assessment:  Consider positive 
incentives as a counter inducement 
strategy.  I.e., focus on reasons for 
scientist not to support non-state 
actors. Stings and “honey pot” 
operations may prove effective. 
Strategic Applicability: Possible 
Target Audience: Terrorist leaders 
and key members 
Assessment: Least effective of all 
strategic options 
Strategic Applicability: Not Likely 
Table 10.   Applying Multiple Strategies against Non-State Actors232 
 
In reviewing the matrix above, it becomes clear that no single strategy can 
stand on its own.  Thus, combinations of strategies or mixed strategies emerge 
                                            
232 Author’s application of the strategic matrix used to explain potential application of traditional 
strategies against non-state actors. 
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as the best approach to mitigate the threat of nuclear terror.  As an example, the 
chart below applies a rating to the “Strategic Applicability” assessments included 
in Table 10.  The table’s ratings are translated into an integrated assessment 
weighted against each network in the figure below.  Adopting a multi-dimensional 
approach, the graph below reflects the output of a set of mixed strategies. 















Figure 11.   Developing Mixed Strategies233                                             
233 Author’s subjective analysis as applied in Table 9 under “Strategic Applicability.”  Values assigned 
are as follows: High (8-10 pts), Possible (5-7 pts.), Unlikely (2-4 pts.), Last Resort (0-1 pts.).  NOTE: In 
reviewing the chart, the most dominant strategies against a terrorist network is prevention (Strategic 
Applicability: rated High) and preemption (Strategic Applicability: rated Last Resort).  Against a proliferation 
network, the most effective mixed strategy is prevention (Strategic Applicability: rated High), deterrence 
(Strategic Applicability: rated Possible), and coercive diplomacy (Strategic Applicability: rated Possible), and 
preemption (Strategic Applicability: rated Unlikely).   Finally, against a supply network, the most dominant 
strategy is prevention (Strategic Applicability: rated High), deterrence (Strategic Applicability: rated 
Possible), preemption (Strategic Applicability: rated Possible), and coercive diplomacy (Strategic 
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This tool is intended to provide users with a concept of integrating strategies as 
necessary to particular networks as part of the overall objective.  By adopting a 
systems approach of attacking all three networks simultaneously, decision-
makers will need to consider how strategies work in concert with one another.  
Future studies should analyze the interoperability of each strategy in order to find 
the appropriate set of mixed strategies to achieve the right formula based on the 
desired impact and results. 
D. SUMMARY 
While the research presented in this study is intended to examine the 
applicability of traditional strategies against nuclear terror, future research is 
needed to expand these concepts to operational and tactical application.  
Opportunities exist for deeper analysis in developing techniques on how such 
strategies may be applied to influence and affect proliferation, supply, and 
terrorist networks.  Additionally, positive inducements such as dissuading 
scientist from engaging in proliferation or tactics to infiltrate these networks 
should also be further developed.  For this thesis, however, the purpose was to 
examine which strategy or combination of strategies would be most effective in 
denying terror networks the ability to buy, steal, or develop nuclear weapons.   
Specifically, this thesis examined and compared traditional strategies such 
as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy to assess their 
applicability in countering the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  As an 
adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying 
asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically induced 
objectives.  While past theoretical approaches concentrated on a singularly 
defined target set, today’s challenges are characterized by a more defused and 
decentralized network.  Today’s challenges compel US policymakers to create 
strategies that are both responsive and flexible in meeting the demands of 
responding to single unitary actors as well as transnational networks.  Mixed 
strategies that are adaptable and flexible would clearly be a step in the right 
direction. 
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In order to better understand the nature of the threat posed by nuclear 
terror, Chapter II examined the perilous nature of nuclear proliferation while 
providing a basic primer as to the characteristics of a nuclear and radiological 
weapon.  Chapter III examined two cases of attempts at nuclear weapons 
acquisition and development by non-state actors, Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda.  
The purpose of this chapter was to apply Martha Crenshaw’s theory of 
organizational behavior and instrumental violence in order to better understand 
the motivations behind extremist groups in the pursuit of mass destruction.  The 
two cases were unique in that, both groups had the means, ability, and 
opportunity to purse their objectives but in the end fail.   
In Chapters IV and V, this thesis examined the strategies of coercive 
diplomacy, preemption, prevention, and deterrence in order to assess its 
applicability against networks and non-state actors.  The author argues that if 
non-state actors were to acquire a nuclear capability, its consequences would not 
only threaten the security of the United States, but would destabilize the 
Westphalian notion of nation-states as recognized unitary actors within the 
international system.  Not since the Treaty of Westphalia and the creation of the 
modern system of nation states, has the international community faced a 
fundamental shift in the international system.  As a result, this final chapter was 
focused on the application of strategies traditionally applied between states 
against non-state actors as way of understanding how they may be applied in 
today’s context.  This thesis concludes with the understanding that no single 
strategy is effective in and of itself.  A combination of mixed strategy supported 
by a multi-dimensional analytical understanding of the threat will be essential to 









APPENDIX A ~ NUCLEAR AMBITIONS 
Cases of Nuclear Reversal since 1945 
Never Tried  (Nuclear 
Abstinence) 
Tried but Gave Up 
(Nuclear Reversal) 
Attained but  
Gave Up* Still Trying 
Attained and 
Maintained 



































NOTE: There have been repeated assertions, but no hard publicly available data, that Finland, Greece, Spain, and 
Turkey may have also had nuclear weapons aspirations. In the absence of evidence to corroborate these assertions, 
these countries are excluded here from the category of nuclear weapons aspirants. 
* For the purposes of this study, the states listed in this category are considered as having undergone nuclear reversal. 
** These states had nuclear weapons deployed on their territory but not under their command.  Only Ukraine appears 
to have had physical possession of Russian nuclear weapons deployed on its soil, although apparently not the codes 
necessary to launch them. 
† The determination and intensity with which these states pursued nuclear weapons remain uncertain. 
∞ These are states that appear to have sought to acquire nuclear weapons on more than one occasion. 
^ Canada’s nuclear weapons–oriented activity began with its participation in the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. 
Subsequently, it remained principally tied to the U.S. and British programs. 
^^ The status of the North Korean nuclear program remains uncertain, although the North Koreans are suspected of 
having produced one or two nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s. See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile 
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate 
(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, December 2001). North Korea appears to have subsequently 
engaged in a clandestine enrichment project, and in late 2002 threatened to reactivate its plutonium production. But 
these actions apparently have not yielded any additional weapons-grade fissile material. See the Carnegie Endowment 
Nonproliferation Project’s website at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/ (accessed September 12, 2005). 
Table 11.   Cases of Nuclear Reversal Since 1945234                                             
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APPENDIX B ~ SMUGGLING INCIDENTS
Incidents Involving Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material 1992-2001235 
Incident Synopsis 
 
Luch Scientific Production Assoc. 
Russia, 1992 
 
This incident involved a chemical engineer and long-time employee of 
the State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also 
known as Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow.4 Beginning in 
May 1992, over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled out of the 
institute small quantities of highly enriched uranium totaling 1.5  
kilograms. In October 1992, the engineer was arrested because police 
suspected him of stealing equipment from the Luch facility. Once in 
custody, the police discovered the nuclear material that he had stolen. 
The individual did not have a specific buyer in mind, but was trying to 
determine if there was a market for the stolen nuclear material. He 
was tried before a Russian court and received 3 years’ probation. 
 
Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993 
 
In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in 
a smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the 
production of, among other things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers, 
aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When 
Lithuanian authorities seized the material, they discovered that some 
of the beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 
0.1 kilogram of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that 
the individuals involved were aware that the beryllium contained the 
enriched uranium. Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated 
at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This 
institute is involved in the research and development of nuclear power 
reactors and employs about 5,000 people and possesses several tons 
of weapons-usable material. 
 
Murmansk, Russia, 1993 
 
 
In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel 
rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were for 
Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and 
contained 36-percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20% or 
greater is considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of 
material totaled about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. 
Russian security officers discovered the missing material and 
apprehended the individuals before the material left the Murmansk 
area. One of the individuals arrested was a guard at the facility and 
was suspected by authorities after the material was missing. The two 
enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two Russian naval 
officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the two enlisted 
personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4 & 5 yrs. 
                                            
235 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation,” 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02426.pdf, (May 2002): 34-39. NOTE: The matrix was adapted in its entirety 




Murmansk, Russia, 1993 
 
In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20% enriched 
uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was 
stolen from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near 
Murmansk, Russia. Three individuals were arrested in connection with 
the theft, including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in 
a garage for several months while they were looking for a prospective 
buyer. The three individuals were arrested and two of the men 
received 3-1/2-year sentences while the third person was acquitted. 
 
St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994 
 
In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for 
trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90%. 
The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal Production 
Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The facility 
produces low-enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power reactors 
and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium for 
nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was 
smuggled out of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the 
material were found inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of 
individual’s homes. 
 
Tengen, Germany, 1994 
 
In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 
0.006 kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium-239 in the home of a 
German citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of 
many components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, 
broken glass, and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The 
presence of mercury in the mixture suggests that the material may 
have been used as part of a red mercury scam. 5 In November 1995, 
the German national was sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison for 
violating arms control laws. The sentence was added onto a 3-year 
term he was already serving time for counterfeiting. 
 
Landshut, Germany, 1994 
 
In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was 
recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, 
long with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a result 
of a police undercover operation. The material was seized in an 
undercover police operation. Three individuals apprehended were 
citizens of the Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A 
German court sentenced several of the individuals to probationary 
terms but one of the group’s leaders was sentenced to 2 years in 
prison. 
 
Munich, Germany, 1994 
 
In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers 
intercepted approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich 
Airport. It is believed that the material originated in Russia’s Institute of 
Physics and Power Engineering. The institute, which is operated by 
Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy, is involved in the research and 
development of nuclear power reactors and possesses several tons of 
weapons-usable material. The material was in a suitcase that had 
arrived on a flight from Moscow. The individuals involved in the 
smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A German court 
sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison and the 
Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4 
years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving 
half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had 
arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved 
in the theft of the material from the institute. 
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Prague, Czech Republic, 1994 
 
In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized 
approximately 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material 
is believed to have been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics 
and Power Engineering. The individuals involved included a Tajikistan 
national, a former Russian nuclear institute worker, and at least one 
Czech national. The material was brought into the Czech Republic on 
a train and then hidden for about 6 months while the individuals 
involved tried to sell it. They were arrested after Czech authorities 
received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave several members 
of the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months to 8 
years. Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved 
the seizure of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. 
According to available information, the composition of the material and 
its location were linked to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In 
both instances, the small quantities of material involved indicated that 
it was a sample that could be used to attract a potential buyer. 
 
Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999 
 
In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border 
checkpoint seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium on the Bulgarian/Romanian border. Rousse is a city 
that serves as Bulgaria’s principal river port and is a transportation hub 
for road and rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded (lead) 
container inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish citizen. 
The driver attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and then 
traveled through Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned to 
find a buyer. A Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling 
techniques, suspected that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the 
driver’s papers revealed a document describing uranium. When the 
driver attempted to bribe the customs officer, his car was thoroughly 
inspected and the officer eventually discovered the vial containing the 
weapons-usable nuclear material. Bulgarian scientists concluded that 
the material was highly enriched uranium. Although the source of the 
material is not certain, it is probable that it came from the Mayak 
Production Association in Russia. This large complex produces special 
isotopes used for industrial, agricultural, and medical purposes and 
also reprocesses naval and civil nuclear power reactor fuel for 
plutonium and uranium recovery. 
 
Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999 
 
In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a 
small metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item 
was analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and 
the two individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison. 
 
Batumi, Georgia, 2000 
 
In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, 
Georgia, for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly 
enriched uranium fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the Black 
Sea located along the Georgia-Turkey border. According to one press 
report, the material may have been smuggled from Russia. The pellets 
mass and shape, together with the reported enrichment level, suggest 
that the pellets were produced for use in a commercial or experimental 
fast breeder reactor. Another report also stated that the smugglers 
were detected when they crossed the Russian border into Georgia, 
possibly by radiation monitoring equipment and were then trailed to 
the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended. It is believed that 
the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into Turkey. 
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Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 
 
In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for 
attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about 
0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched 
uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. 
According to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State 
Security said that two individuals arrested were Georgian citizens, and 
the third was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the 




In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant 
removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, 
deliberately evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated 
items, described as rags and a test tube filled with aging waste 




In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates 
buried in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was 
determined to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as 
americium. According to one report, the material had been smuggled 
into Greece either from one of the countries of the former Soviet Union 
or Bulgaria. Each plate contained a small quantity of plutonium but the 
total amount was about 0.003 kilograms. An official from Greece’s 
atomic energy commission said that the quantity of nuclear material 
found was insufficient to build a nuclear weapon but the material 
posed a health hazard. A law enforcement officer speculated that the 





In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium 
and arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary 
reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of 
laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the 
suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, 
and the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to 
one press account, French police found the material encased in a 
glass bulb that was stored in a lead cylinder. 
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